

# **European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) After Ten Years – Current Situation and Perspectives**

**A Monograph  
by  
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## **Abstract**

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY (ESDP) AFTER TEN YEARS -  
CURRENT SITUATION AND PERSPECTIVES by LTCOL Peter Fischer, German Army, 60  
pages.

After ten years the ESDP has reached an important milestone in its development. It is one of the most dynamic policy areas in the framework of the European Union (EU) and is a substantial integration project. Behind this background the study analyzes the question, What has ESDP achieved in its main fields of action (capabilities, operations/missions and strategic partnership with NATO to include transatlantic relations) to meet the requirements of the European Security Strategy (ESS)? The ESS as the overarching strategic document for the ESDP claims an encompassing security approach and calls to be more capable, more active, more coherent and calls to intensify working with partners. Hence, the ESS together with its implementation report provides the criteria to measure the achievements of the ESDP.

In regard to capability development in many respects progress has been made over the last ten years to be more capable. ESDP specifically has built up military and civilian rapid response capabilities (EU Battlegroups and Civilian Response Teams) and the EU has established a European Defense Agency (EDA). However, there is still a lack in military key capabilities and the military reform process in Europe remains slow. Further improvements are necessary focusing on spending money more efficiently and using the EDA to enhance pooling of assets.

Operations and missions are the ESDP's figurehead to be more active and to meet the requirement of a global security actor. With twenty-two military operations and civilian missions since 2003 the footprint is considerable. ESDP engagements span almost the globe and cover a wide spectrum (stabilization, rule of law, anti-piracy). Nevertheless, they have been limited in scope and time and the ESDP is still untested in 'high end' operations. A key question for the future is less the number of ESDP engagements but their size, mandate and political ambition. To avoid an overextension of the ESDP clear priorities and regional strategies are needed.

With regard to working with partners the current context of the EU - NATO partnership and the underlying transatlantic relations seem more favorable than in the recent years. The United States in principle wants a strong European partner and the ESDP with its civil-military tools is increasingly perceived as added value in a complementary role to NATO for crisis management. There is already close cooperation between EU/ESDP and NATO in the framework of 'Berlin Plus' (Bosnia) or in the way both are working alongside together (Afghanistan, Kosovo). However, despite a more constructive tone between both the unresolved Turkey-Cyprus issue is an obstacle to a true strategic partnership and urgently requires a political solution. In any case, the pull of events, such as Afghanistan, piracy or France's return to NATO's integrated structures, seems to be bringing NATO and the EU/ESDP inexorably closer together.

The availability of all instruments – civil and military – makes the ESDP so attractive but coherent and efficient use is necessary. Initiatives to enhance the coherence of institutional structures and the coordination of the ESDP engagements and the EU Commission's activities have been made but they are not yet sufficient. The Lisbon Treaty in force since December 1<sup>st</sup>, 2009 includes regulations for further improvement of the ESDP and for better coherence but the implementation needs time and results can only be expected gradually.

In summary, this study outlines that the ESDP has made significant progress in the main fields of action and has substantially increased the EU's contribution to international security. However, the ESDP is still a process in the making and a lot still needs to be done. Hence, at the threshold of the second decade of the ESDP this ever advancing process continues and will require all the commitment of its stakeholders.

## Table of Contents

Introduction .....	1
Genesis of ESDP and the Strategic Framework .....	3
Milestones and Fundamentals of ESDP .....	3
The European Security Strategy (ESS) .....	11
Development in the Main Fields of Action of ESDP .....	15
Military and Civilian Capabilities .....	15
Operations and Missions .....	26
Strategic Partnership with NATO and the Transatlantic Dimension.....	36
Conclusions and Perspectives.....	46
APPENDIX A: Timeline of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).....	50
APPENDIX B: The “Three Pillars” of the European Union.....	51
APPENDIX C: ESDP Military Operations and Civilian Missions (as of October 2009).....	52
APPENDIX D: List of Abbreviations .....	54
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	56

## Introduction

Who questions Europe, who despairs of Europe should visit military cemeteries in Europe.<sup>1</sup>  
- Jean Claude Juncker -

European Security and Defense Policy is not longer an aspiration; it is a reality.<sup>2</sup>  
- Javier Solana -

Now ten years in the making, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has reached an important milestone in its development. ESDP is one of the most dynamic and discussed policy areas in the framework of the European Union (EU) and is a substantial integration project.<sup>3</sup> Member states of the EU are working more and more closely together on the political level. In this regard, ESDP is an important instrument, enabling the EU as an international actor with common foreign policy goals.<sup>4</sup>

President Obama's message at the NATO summit in April 2009 to the European member states underlines the current significance and importance of ESDP. According to a European contribution in the field of defense and security, he stated, "We're looking to be partners with Europe. And the more capable they are defensively, the more we can act in concert on the shared challenges that we face."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Jean Claude Juncker, Prime Minister Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, quoted during his discourse in the German Bundestag on the occasion of the Volkstrauertag (Berlin, 16 November 2008). [http://www.gouvernement.lu/salle\\_presse/discours/premier\\_ministre/2008/11-novembre/16-juncker/index.html](http://www.gouvernement.lu/salle_presse/discours/premier_ministre/2008/11-novembre/16-juncker/index.html) - accessed 14 September 2009.

<sup>2</sup> Javier Solana, "Preface," in: *What Ambitions for European Defense in 2020?*, ed. Alvaro de Vasconcelos, EU Institute for Security Studies (Paris 2009), 9.

<sup>3</sup> Stefanie Flechtner, *Neue Impulse in der europäischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Der Verfassungsentwurf des Konvents und die Sicherheitsstrategie von Solana*, ed. Friederich Ebert Stiftung (Bonn 2003), 1.

<sup>4</sup> Sascha Dietrich, *Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik* (Baden-Baden 2006), 469.

<sup>5</sup> Barack Obama, President of the United States, quoted during the joint press conference with the President of the Republic of France during the NATO Summit (Strasbourg, 3 April 2009). <http://ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article1294> – accessed 1 October 2009.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) published in December 2003 underlines the claim of the EU as a global player also in the field of security. The ESS calls to face the uncertain realities of the twenty-first century security environment with an encompassing and cooperative approach.<sup>6</sup> The implementation report to the ESS published in December 2008 confirms also that the EU is increasingly in demand as a contributor to international security, also thanks to an emerging ESDP.<sup>7</sup> As usual in a year of a 'tenth birthday' the ESDP has received a lot of praise. However, the results of a distinctive European approach to defense and security policy should not be a reason for complacency.

This background provides a good opportunity to analyze the question, "What has ESDP achieved in its main fields of action (capabilities, operations/missions and strategic partnership with NATO to include transatlantic relations) to meet the requirements of the ESS?"

Three parts of the study build the methodology for answering this question. The first part shows the genesis of ESDP in the framework of the EU to better understand why ESDP was developed as well as its intention and limitations. Consequently, the ESS, which came into play only in 2003, is addressed as the overarching strategic guideline for the use of a wide spectrum of the instruments at the EU's disposal in a coordinated and comprehensive manner. The ESS and the implementation report give the orientation for the main fields of action the ESDP has to focus on and provide the essential criteria they should meet.

The second and main part of the monograph uses chosen criteria derived from the ESS and the implementation report to analyze the current situation, deficiencies and perspectives in

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<sup>6</sup> Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy (ESS)*, DOC 10881/03 (Brussels 2003), 2-5.  
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st10/st10881.en03.pdf> - accessed 12 September 2009.

<sup>7</sup> Council of the European Union, *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (ESS) – Providing Security in a Changing World*, DOC 17104/08 (Brussels 2008), 4.  
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17104.en08.pdf> - accessed 12 September 2009.



the main fields of action of the ESDP (capabilities, operations/missions and strategic partnership with NATO to include transatlantic relations) to examine what the ESDP has achieved.

The third part of the monograph provides a summary of the conclusions and closes with perspectives and a general outlook for the future of the ESDP.

As the ESDP is an integral instrument of the complex EU structure and not a standalone project, it is also necessary to examine other interdependent aspects of the ESDP, for example the EU Commission. However, this is done in a manner only focused on ESDP-related aspects since an encompassing analysis exceeds the scope of this monograph. Hence, EU arms policy is also excluded since its complexity and its dynamics cannot be considered in detail. Aspects of the EU Reform Treaty of Lisbon (Lisbon Treaty), in force since December 1<sup>st</sup>, 2009 after a long and difficult ratification process, are mentioned with regard to ESDP perspectives but will also not be analyzed in depth.

## **Genesis of ESDP and the Strategic Framework**

The following description of milestones and fundamentals up to the first operational activities in 2003 provides an understanding of the ESDP. Such an understanding facilitates the reflection on strengths, opportunities and limitations of the ESDP, avoiding misleading expectations.<sup>8</sup>

### **Milestones and Fundamentals of ESDP**

During the Cold War, the dominant organization for collective security in Europe was NATO. After the Cold War, the security environment changed significantly. Much more diffuse, complex and less obvious situations of potential instabilities at the periphery of Europe replaced the dominant threat of the Soviet Union. This change called not only for a reevaluation of the role

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<sup>8</sup> For a timeline of the ESDP, see Appendix A.

and purpose of existing organizations, but also a relook at other instruments and organizations which might contribute to stability in a globalized world.<sup>9</sup>

Two concurrent historical events impacted the advance of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and thereby, the course of ESDP maturation. First, was the depth of the European integration process itself. This process eventually reached a point where the question of an intensified political integration came up in order to keep the internal balance of the EU intact. Second, the EU realized the limits of its security policy options during the violent break-up of Yugoslavia.<sup>10</sup> The Balkan Wars, “clearly exposed European military deficiencies in coping with violent conflicts at the EU’s doorstep.”<sup>11</sup> European nations became aware that their individual national capabilities were not sufficient and that a European integration had so far neglected a security component.

A primary milestone for ESDP was the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, in force since 1993, which effectively founded the EU. Stipulations within the treaty delineated steps towards a CFSP. Thereby, the CFSP enhancement became an intergovernmental second pillar of the EU, next to the first pillar of the development of the integrated, supranational European Commission.<sup>12</sup> The Maastricht Treaty specifically denotes, “The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy ...”<sup>13</sup> First and foremost the Treaty required member nations to build upon the defense components of the already existing West European Union (WEU). Therefore the

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<sup>9</sup> Nikolaus Carstens, *The Value of ESDP* (Leavenworth: SAMS - AMSP 2006), 1.

<sup>10</sup> Auswärtiges Amt, *European Security and Defense Policy* (Berlin 2009), 15.

<sup>11</sup> Trine Flockart, “Europe,” in: *Superpower to Besieged Global Power, Restoring World Order after the Failure of the Bush Doctrine*, ed. Edward E. Kolodziej, Roger E. Kanet (Georgia: The University of Georgia Press 2008), 147.

<sup>12</sup> Overview of the Structure of the European Union (EU) see Appendix B.

<sup>13</sup> Council of the European Union, “*The Treaty on the European Union*,” in: *Official Journal of the European Union*, Notice No 1992/ O JC 191, Title V, Article J.4 No. 1 (Brussels 1992). <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html> -accessed 12 September 2009.

Treaty included an indirect request to the WEU to execute decisions and actions of the EU with regard to defense questions. This expansion process was not without repercussions for already existing security and defense alliances, such as NATO. Additionally, the Treaty included an indirect request to NATO to support possible EU military missions, “The development of closer cooperation between two or more member states on a bilateral level in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance shall not be prevented.”<sup>14</sup> A European pillar in the NATO framework as European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) characterized the endeavor. On June 19<sup>th</sup>, 1992 within the ‘Petersberg Declaration’ the WEU Council of Ministers outlined the operational missions which became known as the ‘Petersberg Tasks.’ These tasks included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.<sup>15</sup> The WEU and NATO agreed to work close together and as a result, WEU forces took part in operations together with NATO in the Balkans.<sup>16</sup> Consequently, both organizations established formal arrangements that allowed for the use of NATO capabilities and assets to increase European participation in crisis management.<sup>17</sup>

In the following years however, it became more and more evident that the WEU was not an adequate solution for deepening the integration with regard to security questions. On the one hand, the first pillar of the EU and the CFSP itself became more and more important for effective crisis management. It seemed reasonable to establish a direct EU and NATO relationship without

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<sup>14</sup> Council of the European Union, *The Treaty on the European Union*, Title V, Article J.4 No. 5.

<sup>15</sup> Meeting of the Minister Council of the WEU at the Petersberg (Bonn, 19.June 1992). [www.glasnost.de/militaer/weu/92weubonn.html#Petersberg](http://www.glasnost.de/militaer/weu/92weubonn.html#Petersberg) - accessed 19 September 2009.

<sup>16</sup> Veaceslav Bugai, *European Security Organizations in the Post Cold War Security Environment. The New Frame for European Security* (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School 2006), 43.

<sup>17</sup> On June 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1996 in Berlin the NATO Foreign Ministers endorsed during their meeting an official framework agreement for the use of NATO installations and assets by the WEU for respective WEU-operations. This agreement is the basis for the later endorsed framework agreement between NATO and the EU known as ‘Berlin Plus.’ See NATO Communiqués, *Press Communiqué M-NACC – 1(96) 64, Chairman’s Summary* (Berlin, 4. Juni 1996). <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-064e.htm> - accessed 20 September 2009.

the complicated procedure through the WEU. On the other hand, the different memberships in the WEU and the EU became more and more a roadblock to a coherent integration process. Because of the special character of the WEU Treaty, all attempts to gain concurrence in memberships failed.<sup>18</sup> Thus, the Amsterdam Treaty was the next step and entered into force in 1999, and the ‘Petersberg Tasks’ of the WEU were incorporated into the EU framework. However, these tasks initially were still carried out by the WEU at the behest of the EU.<sup>19</sup>

The years 1998 and 1999 saw the inception of the ESDP. In the 1998 St. Malo Declaration, Great Britain and France jointly argued that the EU needed the ability to act autonomously, backing their action with military force if necessary.<sup>20</sup> The British – French St. Malo initiative was a breakthrough because of the confluence of a number of factors: “The realization of Europe’s military weakness with regard to the Kosovo crisis, which convinced all governments of the need to develop an EU crisis management capacity; the fundamental change of British Policy; and the supportive attitude of the United States.”<sup>21</sup>

According to Trine Flockart, “St. Malo opened up the possibility of embarking on the road toward a security and defense integration that had been politically introduced in the Treaty

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<sup>18</sup> The formally neutral EU Member States like Sweden and Austria did not accept the nature of collective defense outlined in the Article V of the WEU. For that reason, they permanently refused to become members of the WEU. Hence, a harmonization of EU and WEU membership was not possible.

<sup>19</sup> Auswärtiges Amt, *ESDP*, 15.

<sup>20</sup> The shift of course of UK Prime Minister Tony Blair to support autonomous European Defense Capabilities had two main factors. First, the gap between the European NATO Members and the US could only be narrowed if the Europeans strengthened their own capabilities. Second, the UK wanted to avoid a marginalization in the EU as they had opted out the EURO and wanted to show responsibility during their own EU Presidency in the first half of 1998, see David T. Armitage, (Jr.), *A Comparative Analysis of US Policy Toward European Defense Autonomy: Enduring Dilemmas in Transatlantic Relations* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008), 114-116.

<sup>21</sup> Fraser Cameron, *The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 80. Although the United States attitude was supportive to St. Malo and the Clinton Administration supported the development of a strong European partner, Washington did not want to see ESDP evolve in a way that would undermine NATO. These concerns were reflected in the statement of Madeleine Albright underlining to respect the 3 D’s (no duplications with NATO capabilities, no decoupling from NATO, no discrimination of non EU NATO members). Quoted Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State, *The Right Balance Will Secure NATO’s Future*, *Financial Times* (London, 7 December 1998).

of Amsterdam. Almost immediately following St. Malo, the situation in Kosovo started to deteriorate rapidly. The conflict underlined the need for ESDP and the growing gap in capabilities between the Americans and the Europeans. The result was a rapid succession of decisions.”<sup>22</sup>

Hence, the Cologne European Council in June 1999 during the German Presidency of the EU-Council was the birthplace of the common European Security and Defense Policy, from then on known as ESDP. The primary outcome of the council meeting was an understanding that the EU required an independent capacity for crisis management and an expansion of military capabilities. Thus, in Cologne the EU heads of state adopted a declaration on strengthening the common European policy on security and defense which stated the central objective of ESDP, “The conduct of international crisis management operations and the establishment of the necessary structures and the required civilian and military capabilities.”<sup>23</sup> The Treaty of Amsterdam had set the conditions for the inclusion of the ‘Petersberg Tasks’ into the CFSP. Subsequently, the Cologne Council established that the WEU was also part of CFSP. Javier Solana was nominated High Representative of CFSP and, with Solana in office, the CFSP had a face, a spokesperson others could identify with the CFSP.<sup>24</sup>

In December 1999, the recommendations made in Cologne provided the impetus for EU discussions during the Council of Helsinki. The Council Declaration stated, “The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. NATO remains the foundation of the collective defense of its members, and will continue to have an important role in crisis management. Further work will be

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<sup>22</sup> Trine Flockart, *Europe*, 148.

<sup>23</sup> Auswärtiges Amt, *ESDP*, 17.

<sup>24</sup> Karsten Kestermann, *Die ESVP als Konkurrenz zur NATO? – Entwicklungen, Analysen und Strategieaussichten einer europäischen Verteidigungsdimension* (Potsdam 2006), 43.

taken to ensure full mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency with NATO.”<sup>25</sup> Thereby, the Council explicitly avoided unnecessary duplication of effort by both organizations. Furthermore, the EU underscored its wish for a strategic alliance, with the common understanding that both organizations needed to complement each other rather than compete.<sup>26</sup>

The Council also agreed to build up the military capabilities necessary for such operations by 2003. Also known as the ‘Helsinki Headline Goal’, this ambition was to be accomplished on a voluntary basis until 2003 to meet the ‘Petersberg Tasks.’ One goal was the establishment of a reaction force with a strength of approximately 50,000-60,000 soldiers. This force’s capability included deployment within 60 days with a minimum of in place sustainment up to one year.<sup>27</sup> During the Council Meeting at Feira, Portugal, member states agreed on a Civilian Headline Goal and on establishing civilian crisis management instruments.<sup>28</sup>

Article 17 (1) of the Nice Treaty of 2000 legally anchored the ESDP as part of the CFSP within the intergovernmental part of the Treaty of the EU. This restructuring rendered the EU with control of crisis management functions at large, making the WEU superfluous.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, the institutional structures and procedures created via the Nice Treaty strengthened the need for the EU. Thus, with the ESDP as an integrated element, the CFSP finally developed

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<sup>25</sup> EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS), “*European Council Helsinki*,” in: *From St. Malo to Nice* (Chaillot Paper 47, European Defense Core Documents, Volume II compiled by Maartje Ruttem (Paris 2001), 82 -84. <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp047e.pdf> - accessed 19. September 2009.

<sup>26</sup> The relationship between NATO and ESDP will be discussed in Chapter 3.

<sup>27</sup> EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS), *European Council Helsinki*, 82.

<sup>28</sup> In Feira the goal was to create a pool of 5,000 police officers, 200 judges, prosecutors and other experts and 2,000 civil protection experts. See EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS) ed.: *European Council Helsinki*, 136. Chapter 3 of the monograph details the development of the military and civilian capabilities.

<sup>29</sup> The WEU will likely exist on paper until the EU-Reform Treaty of Lisbon will be fully implemented. The Lisbon Treaty encompasses a support obligation clause similar to the WEU stipulation. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty once in effect will render the WEU superfluous.

some teeth with the possibility of using military and civilian capacities for the purpose of crisis management.<sup>30</sup>

In December 2002, the long and at times difficult negotiations regarding the EU access to NATO operational capabilities were finalized with ‘Berlin Plus’. Subsequently, the EU declared its willingness to take control of military operations in Macedonia and Bosnia. By January 2003, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) had commenced its work in Bosnia as the first civilian ESDP mission. In March of 2003, the EU undertook the first military crisis management operation within the framework of ‘Berlin Plus.’<sup>31</sup> This operation, named CONCORDIA, took over the NATO operation ALLIED HARMONY, which engaged in Macedonia.<sup>32</sup>

There are three main aspects of the ESDP that reflect its intention as well as its limitations. The ESDP was from the beginning designated to cover both civil and military aspects of crisis management. This is the ‘corporate identity’ which makes the ESDP unique in comparison to other organizations and a part of the overall encompassing security approach of the EU. Javier Solana significantly underlined this identity, “My aim from the start on... was to promote the EU as a global political player, capable of mobilizing all resources available. Therefore, it was necessary to start to develop ... instruments and capabilities, both civilian and

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<sup>30</sup> The most important bodies are:

The Political and Security Committee (PSC), which comprises ambassadors from the 27 EU member states who deal with all CFSP issues. It exercises political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations on behalf of the Council.

The Military Committee of the EU (EUMC), which is made up of the member states’ Chiefs of General Staff or their representatives. The Military Committee advises the PSC on military crisis management issues and the development of military capabilities. The Chair of the Military Committee also acts as an advisor to the Secretary-General/High Representative on all military issues. The EU Military Staff (EUMS), part of the EU-Council Secretariat, does the preparatory work for the Military Committee.

The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), which is comprised of diplomats and civilian crisis management specialists and advises the PSC on all issues of civilian crisis management.

<sup>31</sup> Clemens von Götze, “*Die Europäische Union – Entwicklung der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik*,” in: *Kompendium zur Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik* (Berlin 2009), 5.

<sup>32</sup> The current operational picture regarding military operations and civilian missions is outlined in Chapter 3 of the monograph.

military, which were essential if the EU was to have any international credibility.”<sup>33</sup> Or as following description outlines more encompassingly, “Through ESDP and the instruments available to the European Commission and the EU member states, the European Union has the complete range of tools for crisis prevention, crisis management and post-crisis rehabilitation at its disposal. It has both military and civilian capabilities, provided by the member states ...; this is what makes the ESDP so attractive.”<sup>34</sup>

ESDP as part of CFSP is integrated in the intergovernmental sphere. Member states insist on keeping decisions regarding to security and defense matters as a national responsibility. Even the Lisbon Treaty does not include any plans to change to qualified majority voting in the field of security and defense matters.<sup>35</sup> Consequently, the member states themselves remain the decisive factor in formulating strategies and taking decisions for launching operations through an unanimous decision making process. Hence, this process remains time consuming and results often represent the lowest common denominator. Participation in operations and missions is on a volunteer basis. Furthermore, effective and coordinated use of CFSP/ESDP together with the crisis management tools of the EU Commission, representing the first supranational pillar involving also diplomatic, development and economic measures, remains a significant challenge.

ESDP is currently focused on crisis management within the framework of the extended ‘Petersberg Tasks.’<sup>36</sup> With regard to collective defense, the Lisbon Treaty includes in Article 28

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<sup>33</sup> Javier Solana, “*Preface*,” in: *EU Security and Defense Policy – The First Five Years (1999 – 2004)*, ed. Nicole Gnesotto, EU Institute for Security Studies (Paris 2004), 6.

<sup>34</sup> Auswärtiges Amt, *ESDP*, 7.

<sup>35</sup> Council of the European Union, “*Treaty of Lisbon*,” in: *Official Journal of the European Union*, Notice No 2007/C 306/01 (Brussels 2007). <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML> – accessed 4 October 2009.

<sup>36</sup> The measures which encompass the extended ‘Petersberg Tasks’ are delineated in Art. 28 B (1) of the Lisbon Treaty and are: Joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. See Council of the European Union, *Treaty of Lisbon*, Art. 28 B (1).



A (7) a political clause which stipulates that this remains first and foremost the common responsibility of NATO.<sup>37</sup> These regulations underscore that EU, is not capable of facilitating a common defense via the ESDP. For the foreseeable future, Europe's collective defense will remain the responsibility of NATO. Hence, in this regard there is no competition between NATO and the ESDP.

## **The European Security Strategy (ESS)**

ESDP developed in the context of EU integration and was influenced by events affecting the European regional security that provided the backdrop for the summit of St. Malo and the Council Meeting of Cologne. The ESS characterizes the most notable next developmental step.<sup>38</sup> With the EU Council declaration of the ESS in December 2003 by Javier Solana, the member states agreed on a comprehensive foreign and security policy framework. The ESS helped overcome differences between member states over the Iraq war, enabling all in working out a common strategic understanding.<sup>39</sup> The EU's strategic position expressed in the ESS follows the paradigm shifts incurred by the events of 1989, 1990 and September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001. Some perceive the ESS as an answer to the September 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) "...which attempts, at least alignment with the American debate regarding the appropriate reaction to new

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<sup>37</sup> This is outlined in Art. 28 A (7) of the Lisbon Treaty: "If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation." See Council of the European Union, *Treaty of Lisbon*, Art. 28 A (7).

<sup>38</sup> Erich Reiter, "Die Entwicklungen der ESVP und der transatlantischen Beziehungen," in: *Strategische Analysen*, ed. Büro für Sicherheitspolitik (Wien 2004), 20.

<sup>39</sup> Clemens von Götze, *Die Europäische Union*, 5.

dangers in a globalized world.”<sup>40</sup> Or as Christopher Hill states, ”The ESS was produced partly in order to adapt new circumstances but also to convince the Americans that Europe was not totally mired in delusional ‘soft power’ thinking.”<sup>41</sup>

As the strategy document outlines, “The ESS serves as a basis both for strategic dialogue with the most important partners of the EU, especially the United States, and for defining the EU’s common security interests. The strategy also directly addresses the citizens of the EU. It was the first document to outline, in terms that the general public could relate to, a framework for the CFSP and the ESDP that will continue to serve as a guideline for the EU member states and institutions.”<sup>42</sup>

The introduction of the ESS document claims the overarching guideline for the EU, declaring, “... with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), the EU is a global actor; it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security.”<sup>43</sup> The strategy discusses global challenges and risks and the instruments the EU has at its disposal to counter them. It assumes a comprehensive understanding of security and identifies in the first part of the document five principal threats to the security of the EU and its member states. These five principal threats are: international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime.<sup>44</sup>

Against this background, in the second part of the document the ESS defines three strategic goals. First, the EU intends to counter these new threats by an early use of the full range of available instruments. Timely action has priority to address the causes of conflict where they

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<sup>40</sup> Johann Frank, Gustav Gustenau, Erich Reiter, *Anmerkungen zum Entwurf einer Europäischen Sicherheitsstrategie*, in: Strategische Analysen, ed. Büro für Sicherheitspolitik (Wien 2003), 9.

<sup>41</sup> Christopher Hill, “*Britain and the European Security Strategy*,” in: *German Foreign Policy*, A Quarterly E-Newsletter on German Foreign Policy No. 5, p. 24 - 31 (Berlin 2004), 13.

<sup>42</sup> Auswärtiges Amt, *ESDP*, 13.

<sup>43</sup> Council of the European Union, *ESS - A Secure Europe in a Better World*, 2-5.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

occur. Second, the EU will act in a global manner. The ESS also places emphasis on establishing security in the EU's immediate neighborhood. This goal shall be reached by establishing a ring of stable and responsibly governed states from the EU's eastern borders to the Mediterranean. Third, the EU is committed to a global order based on effective multilateralism and international law. This reflects the expression of the Europeans' conviction that no nation can meet the new global challenges alone.<sup>45</sup> The third part of the ESS calls for member states to be more active, more capable, and more coherent and to work more intensively with partners.<sup>46</sup>

As member states articulated a need for a first evaluation of the ESS, Javier Solana submitted an implementation report for the strategy in December 2008. The report confirms the strategy's continuing role as a solid basis for the EU's actions. It presents a more detailed analysis of the threats posed in the areas of cyber, environmental and energy security as well as by climate change. To achieve an even more capable foreign policy, the report calls for the EU and its member states to make greater efforts in developing the instruments necessary to implement the ESS.<sup>47</sup> The implementation report outlines again that the EU "for its full potential to be realized needs to be still more capable, more active and more coherent and has to intensify cooperation with international organizations."<sup>48</sup>

Out of these demands derive the main fields of action for the ESDP. Furthermore, the ESS and the implementation report include criteria each main field of action should meet. These criteria provide the basis to analyze the current status, deficiencies and perspectives in the main fields of action (development of capabilities, operations/missions and strategic partnership with NATO to include transatlantic relations) to assess what ESDP has achieved so far.

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<sup>45</sup>Council of the European Union, *ESS - A Secure Europe in a Better World*, 6-10.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 11-13.

<sup>47</sup> Auswärtiges Amt, *ESDP*, 13.

<sup>48</sup> Council of the European Union, *Report on the Implementation of the ESS*, 4.

With regard to being more capable the ESS addresses the capability development as a main field of action for ESDP. Out of the ESS and the implementation report come three main criteria for military capabilities, the need to do more about key capabilities to include rapid response, the systematic use of pooled and shared assets and the effective use of resources. For civilian capabilities the essential criteria is a need for greater capacity to bring civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations.<sup>49</sup>

With regard to being more active, the ESS addresses ESDP operations and missions as a main field of action. The derived criterion is the contribution of ESDP missions and operations enabling the EU to take responsibility as a global security actor.<sup>50</sup>

Another main field of the ESDP is focused on working with partners like international organizations or other bilateral relations. The ESS and the implementation report call specifically to intensify NATO and the transatlantic partnership, noting, “EU and NATO must deepen their strategic partnership for better co-operation and crisis management.”<sup>51</sup> Hence, this is the criterion to measure the achievements of the ESDP in this field of action.

The call to be more coherent is a challenge in all main fields of action of the ESDP. For ESDP to contribute to the effective use of all civil and military instruments available to the EU, but also for internal coherent use of the existing structures, close coordination is a necessity.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Council of the European Union, *ESS - A Secure Europe in a Better World*, 11-12 and Council of the European Union, *Report on the Implementation of the ESS*, 15. As a reference to the ESS the Military and the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 reflect also these main criteria for capability development beside other detailed objectives.

<sup>50</sup> Council of the European Union, *ESS - A Secure Europe in a Better World*, 3 and 11 and Council of the European Union, *Report on the Implementation of the ESS*, 14.

<sup>51</sup> Council of the European Union, *Report on the Implementation of the ESS*, 4.

<sup>52</sup> Council of the European Union, *ESS - A Secure Europe in a Better World*, 11-12 and Council of the European Union, *Report on the Implementation of the ESS*, 13-14.

## Development in the Main Fields of Action of ESDP

### Military and Civilian Capabilities

The ESDP can only be effective and more capable, when it can address both military and civilian capabilities. In words often heard in the European Community and in member states discussions, “It is all about capabilities.”<sup>53</sup> Within the EU there is a common understanding that its comparative advantage in crisis-management should be its ability to blend civil and military means.<sup>54</sup> This requires balanced development of civilian and military capabilities that reflects a consensus that soft power only is not enough.

With regard to the development of military capabilities, intensive work started from the beginning on of the ESDP with the Headline Goal 2003 process to be able to conduct the full spectrum of the ‘Petersberg Tasks.’ Since then numerous initiatives and actions have been taken to increase military capabilities. Already in 2003 the EU declared that the Headline Goal 2003 was accomplished, but only in quantitative terms.<sup>55</sup> Hence, the European Council pointed out in their declaration that the operational capability “is limited by recognized shortfalls.”<sup>56</sup> These shortfalls were evident in key capabilities, particularly in the areas of strategic transport and strategic reconnaissance.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Alexander Stubb, “*In Search of Smart Power*,” in: *What Ambitions for European Defense in 2020?*, ed. Alvaro de Vasconcelos, EU Institute for Security Studies (Paris 2009), 125.

<sup>54</sup> Nick Witney, *Re-energizing Europe’s Security and Defense Policy*, ed. European Council on Foreign Relations (Brussels 2008), 11.

<sup>55</sup> The Helsinki Force Catalogue listed national contributions of more than 100,000 personnel approximately 400 fighter jets and 100 ships. These forces and equipment pre-existed and were listed also available for NATO and United Nations. However, new purchases and efforts to close the qualitative gap did not occur. See Daniel Keohane, “*ESDP and Military Reform*,” in: *The Politics of European Security*, ed. Jess Pilegaard (Kopenhagen 2004), 106-107.

<sup>56</sup> Nick Witney, *Re-energizing ESDP*, 30 and footnote 20.

<sup>57</sup> Auswärtiges Amt, *ESDP*, 20. The decision to declare the ESDP operational, although significant qualitative capability gaps were still evident, was taken for political reasons. Behind the background of 9/11 the EU wanted to confirm the ability to fight in cooperation with the U.S. against the threat of terror. See Sybille Lang, “*Bestimmungsfaktoren und Handlungsfähigkeit der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESDP)*”, in: *Europäische Hochschulschriften* (Frankfurt am Main 2007), 134.

Thus, in May 2004 the EU member states through the European Council declared a new Headline Goal 2010. While the old Headline Goal issued primarily concentrated on quantitative demands, the new 2010 Headline Goal was designed in the context of the emerging strategic framework to complement the ESS concentrates on qualitative improvement. The new Headline Goal was in accordance with the main demands of the ESS. At the center was the evaluation of the capability objectives achieved so far and the enhancement of key capabilities (for example strategic transport). The two primary projects of the 2010 Headline Goal were the improvement of rapid response capability by the inception of rapid deployable EU Battlegroups (EU BG) and the establishment of the European Defense Agency (EDA) to better facilitate the pooling of military capabilities and asset sharing.<sup>58</sup> Behind this background an analysis of the current status and deficiencies with regard to the improvement of key capabilities to include rapid response, pooling and asset sharing, and the effective use of resources follows.

In the context of key capabilities, several weaknesses were identified in several member state forces. Based on these disparities, a Capability Development Plan (CDP) was devised in the form of a long term matrix. The matrix prioritizes capability gaps, analyzes potentially needed capabilities by 2025, outlines the national member states programs and assesses operational lessons learned. This plan supports the analysis of national defense planning and funding decisions.<sup>59</sup>

In the second half of 2008, the French-led EU Council presidency devised concrete initiatives for further military improvements within the key capabilities. The improvements were based on the identified capability gaps. This includes improving the availability of helicopters through common training and modernization of existing equipment, implementation of a

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<sup>58</sup> Council of the European Union, *Headline Goal 2010, DOC 6805/03* (Brussels 2004). <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf> – accessed 3 November 2009.

<sup>59</sup> Clemens von Götze, *Die Europäische Union*, 12.

European Air Transport Command (EATC) as a nucleus for a European Air Transport Fleet (EATF), a European Carrier Group Interoperability Initiative, development of a Multinational Space-Based Imaging System for Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Observation (MUSIS), enhancement of the use of the EU Satellite-Center (EUSC), enhancement of Unmanned Armed Vehicles (UAV), Maritime Mine Clearance and Maritime Surveillance. In December 2008, the EU member states committed themselves to the European Council in a declaration which addressed capability development to facilitate these improvements.<sup>60</sup>

With regard to the analysis of deficits in key capabilities, the initiatives taken point in the right direction to close capability gaps. Nevertheless, improving key capabilities beyond the planning process towards gaining actual operational availability will take time. Fostering the key capabilities is a gradual process which will not be fully attained in the foreseeable future. An example is the implementation of the EATF, whose assembly is delayed because of the setbacks in acquiring the Airbus A400M. This weaknesses in regard to limited military capabilities, already determined by the Council in 2003, continue to persist.<sup>61</sup> Thus the critical remark from the former Chief Executive of the EDA, Nick Witney, is not completely unfounded, as he states, "...some kind of a pattern of under-achievement has become by now familiar."<sup>62</sup>

The EU Battlegroup concept is an important stepping stone for the realization of rapid response capabilities. A common French, German and British initiative to establish an EU rapid

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<sup>60</sup> Council of the European Union, *Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities of 11 December 2008*, (Brussels 2008). [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/104676.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/104676.pdf) - accessed 3 November 2009.

<sup>61</sup> The last Capability Improvement Chart from 2006 noted that a mere of 12 of the 64 original capability deficiencies were tackled successfully and even then sometimes only partially and up to now the situation is unchanged. See Council of the European Union, *Capabilities Improvement Chart I/2006* (Brussels 2006). [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/89603.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/89603.pdf) - accessed 4 November 2009.

<sup>62</sup> Nick Witney, *Re-energizing ESDP*, 9.

response capability for a military crisis led to the creation of the EU Battlegroups in 2004.<sup>63</sup> An EU Battlegroup is comprised of an infantry battalion, the required mobile headquarters as well as the support staff and consists of about 1,500 soldiers. The units are rapidly deployable and capable of conducting limited independent operations or the initial phase of a larger operation. In 2007, the EU Battlegroups reached full operational capability. Thus, according to the concept, two EU Battlegroups are always available, each for a period of six months.<sup>64</sup> Since 2007, through the Headline Goal process 2010 the EU has fulfilled the rapid response criteria, which is a key development. The EU Battlegroup concept has proven itself as a common base for fostering the willingness of EU member states to participate. Up to the second term of 2011, the stand up of two EU Battlegroups is guaranteed.<sup>65</sup> Nevertheless, having not yet deployed the EU Battlegroups cannot be evaluated based on operational experience.

In addition, the creation of the EDA agreed upon by member states in 2004. The EDA is critical to realizing the criteria of systematic use of pooled and shared assets. The agency was established “...to support the Member States and the Council in their efforts to improve European defense capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future.”<sup>66</sup> Along with developing defense capabilities, the EDA is to promote armaments cooperation, improve the industrial and technological basis in the field of defense,

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<sup>63</sup> EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS) ed., “*The Battlegroups Concept – UK/France/Germany Food for Thought Paper*,” in: *EU Security and Defense – Core Documents 2004*, Chaillot Paper 75 (Paris 2005), 10 -16. <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp075e.pdf> - accessed 3 November 2009.

<sup>64</sup> Auswärtiges Amt, *ESDP*, 19.

<sup>65</sup> EU Military Staff, *Battlegroup Roster* (Brussels, June 2009).

<sup>66</sup> Council of the European Union, *Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of the Council of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defense Agency* (Brussels 2004), 4. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2004E0551:20080407:EN:PDF> – accessed 3 November 2009.



support the establishment of a competitive market for European defense equipment and promote cooperative research in defense technology.<sup>67</sup>

The conception of the agency is a significant development. It has made great strides in improving defense capabilities, specifically in regard to coordination of pooling and sharing assets. The adaptation of the CDP is primarily in the hands of the EDA in close coordination with the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the EU Military Committee (EUMC). Moreover, the key capability initiatives stipulated by the capability declaration of 2008, are within the responsibility of the agency. Specific capabilities initiatives, such as the MUSIS project for space observation which is coordinated by EDA have shown the value of the synergetic effects through the involvement of various member states.<sup>68</sup>

Nevertheless, a deficiency is that pooling of individual member states capabilities to achieve synergetic effects has not been fully realized by the EU. The wish of the member states to retain their national force capabilities and command structures hampers further development.<sup>69</sup> A variety of national defense projects exist which could help to close capability gaps, but without harmonizing them their projects cost time. According to Nick Witney, there is fundamentally, “...a lack of resolve to pool resources, to modernize armed forces and deploy them.”<sup>70</sup>

A further problem exists in the realm of spending resources for defense because in the past years the EU member states constantly underfinanced their defense budgets. There is a lack of political will and a reluctance to make tough decisions for real restructuring and modernization

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<sup>67</sup> Auswärtiges Amt, *ESDP*, 22.

<sup>68</sup> Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Greece and Belgium take part in this project.

<sup>69</sup> Volker Heise, *Zehn Jahre Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP) – Entwicklung, Stand und Probleme*, ed. Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) – Studie (Berlin, Oktober 2009), 31-32.

<sup>70</sup> Nick Witney, *Re-energizing ESDP*, 2.

of the defense sector.<sup>71</sup> Given the current economic crisis, a significant increase in national defense budgets which might close capability gaps is unlikely. Thus, the primary path to synergy lies in the more effective use of the available scarce resources. According to the Chief Executive of the EDA, Alexander Weis, the agency is well aware that defense budgets of the member states will most likely remain constrained and therefore only working together in Europe will reduce costs. And he notes, “The EDA is well- placed in the family of European institutions to coordinate and stimulate this development.”<sup>72</sup>

With regard to civilian capabilities in 2002, the Civilian Headline Goal determined in Feira in 2002 was quantitatively fulfilled. In December 2004, a new Civilian Headline Goal for 2008 was announced and later harmonized in time with the 2010 military goal. The Civilian Headline Goal 2010 is intended to bring about improvements in quality, especially by enhancing rapid response capability in the civilian sector and mobilizing adequate resources for civilian crisis management.<sup>73</sup> This emphasis on quality targets the need for greater capacity to bring civilian resources to bear in crisis and in post crisis situations.

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<sup>71</sup> In particular to note is, that from the approximately 201 billion EUR (in 2006) defense budgets of all EU member states only some 19 % were spent for investments (United States ca. 29 % of their total defense budget of some 450 billion EUR in 2006) and Europeans in total only spend in average meager 1.78 % of the national GDPs (United States ca. 4%). EU states combined spend only 1.5% for Research and Technology while the United States spends 9%. Furthermore, outdated requirements of the Cold War still dominate inventories, for example. European Armed Forces still own more than 10,000 main battle tanks and 2500 combat aircraft. The so far unsatisfying force structure is also reflected by the fact that of the nearly 2 million soldiers of European Member States only 30% are able to operate outside of national territory and only about 5 % are deployed. See Nick Witney, *Re-energizing ESDP*, 16-23.

<sup>72</sup> Alexander Weis, “*Improving Capabilities for ESDP’s Future Needs*,” in: *What Ambitions for European Defense in 2020?*, ed. Alvaro de Vasconcelos, EU Institute for Security Studies (Paris 2009), 109.

<sup>73</sup> Council of the European Union, *Civilian Headline Goal 2010* (Brussels 2007). [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Civilian\\_Headline\\_Goal\\_2010.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Civilian_Headline_Goal_2010.pdf) - accessed 7 November 2009.

In June 2005 to facilitate civilian rapid response capabilities, specifically to speed up their quick deployment, the EU established Civilian Response Teams (CRT).<sup>74</sup> The CRTs provide a pool of experts for a rapid deployment of flexible size and composition within five days, for assessment and fact finding, mission build-up or support of existing crisis management activities.

The availability of civilian experts in the areas of police, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection available for crisis management for the EU is unique for multinational organizations. Counting all available forces declared by EU member states, a conglomerate of over 12,000 civilian experts exist for crisis management.<sup>75</sup> Currently over 2,600 civilian experts are engaged in civilian ESDP missions. Part of the civilian capabilities is not only the number of personnel, but also their qualitative impact with regard to training, planning and leadership enhancement.

Nevertheless, weaknesses in the development of civilian capabilities can be delineated. The member states voluntarily declared the number of operational civilian personnel. Consequently, civilian forces are not immediately and always available. According to the latest 2007 EU report on civilian capabilities, there are deficits, specifically for police officers, lawyers and detention experts (there is, for example, a deficit of some 400 detention experts.)<sup>76</sup> Furthermore, one of the greatest problems is the lack of a joint recruitment system for civilian ESDP missions. Missions are essentially based on backup and reserves being made available,

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<sup>74</sup> Christian Behme, Tanja Cohrs, “GASP, ESVP und ihre Instrumente ein Überblick,” in: *Deutscher Bundestag - Wissenschaftliche Dienste*, Nr. 44/2006 (Berlin, 18 September 2006), 3-4.

<sup>75</sup> In June 2008 the detailed numbers were: 5671 police officers, 631 law experts, 565 experts in civil administration, 579 experts in civil protection (as well as 4445 staff for intervention teams), 505 personnel for Monitoring. See Factsheet European Security and Defense Policy, *The Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management* (Brussels 2008). [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/BackgroundJPO2008-Civilian\\_aspects\\_compressed.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/BackgroundJPO2008-Civilian_aspects_compressed.pdf) - accessed 7 November 2009.

<sup>76</sup> Council of the European Union, *Final Report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2008*, (Brussels 2007). <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st14/st14807.en07.pdf> - accessed 7 November 2009. See also Volker Heise, *10 Jahre ESVP*, 22 and footnote 68.

which is increasingly difficult in particular for missions that take place in challenging security environments.<sup>77</sup> The need for improvisation and the inability to generate civilian experts in time are still critical points in launching a civilian ESDP mission. Lessons learned from the missions in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFG) and Georgia (EUMM Georgia) underscore that mission support is also an area where significant improvement is necessary. The lack of material, field headquarters with in sufficient financial and administrative experts, particularly in the procurement field is evident. Furthermore, training and exercises remain key to qualifying personnel for ESDP operations and missions.<sup>78</sup>

In achieving coherence between civil and military capability development, the time-tables of the Headline Goals are harmonized for both. This harmonization of the planning horizon both to 2010 allows the contemplation for further development of a common approach. In the second term of 2009, the Swedish led EU Council presidency declared finding common approaches as a focal point in fostering the coordination of civil and military capabilities developments.<sup>79</sup> In time a common civil-military Headline Goal is envisioned. This Headline Goal would open up the possibility of additional synergy and inter-operability between civilian and military forces.

Coherence in regard to capabilities requires also looking at the EU Commission. The EU demands to make use of all available instruments. Hence, the EU Commission and its civilian capabilities also come into play. First and foremost the Commission has significant funding at its

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<sup>77</sup> Juha Auvinen, Richard Wright, “*What Ambitions for the Civilian ESDP?*” in: *What Ambitions for European Defense in 2020?*, ed. Alvaro de Vasconcelos, EU Institute for Security Studies (Paris 2009), 112-113.

<sup>78</sup> Clemens von Götze, *Die Europäische Union*, 13.

<sup>79</sup> See Swedish EU Council Presidency, Internal Working Document for the Defense Policy Directors Meeting (Stockholm, June 2009).

disposal and a worldwide network of foreign representations and delegations.<sup>80</sup> Therefore, it is imperative that measures of the EU Commission and the ESDP should be harmonized to bring about envisioned effects. Initiatives for greater coordination are outlined in the 2010 Civilian Headline Goal. The implementation of the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 started with work on a new common pilot illustrative scenario supportive of both civilian and military ESDP capability development processes that take into account relevant capabilities available to the European Community to include the civilian capabilities of the EU Commission.<sup>81</sup> By the end of 2010, this inventory will be completed. The EDA also promotes a ‘cross pillar’ approach.<sup>82</sup> This coordination is based on the recognition that military and civilian means both needed and used in crisis management.

In summary, the results in the main field of capability development are thus mixed. Volker Heise provides a useful assessment on the current situation and deficiencies of capability development, “The current civil and military capabilities are sufficient to fulfill the ‘Petersberg Tasks.’ Nevertheless, these capabilities are merely sufficient for stability operations in a post-conflict scenario such as Bosnia, at the perimeter of a conflict such as Chad, or time and mission restricted operations such as in the Congo. For more complex conflicts such as dividing the opposing forces such as during the 1999 combat mission in Kosovo, these abilities are not sufficient.”<sup>83</sup> Thus, these self-imposed goals are not yet met.

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<sup>80</sup> The EU Commission has for example a budget of some 4 billion EUR for crisis management available for the budget year 2009. In this context the budget for CFSP with 242 million EUR, out of which civilian missions are funded, is very meager. European Commission, *EC Haushalt 2009, VOL 4 – Root, Title 7, 19, 21, 23* (Brussels 2008). [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/LBL2009\\_VOL4/DE/Vol4.pdf](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/LBL2009_VOL4/DE/Vol4.pdf) - accessed 7 November 2009.

<sup>81</sup> Council of the European Union, *Civilian Headline Goal 2010*, and Factsheet European Security and Defense Policy, *The Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management*, 3.

<sup>82</sup> One example is seeking civil-military synergies with research investment of the Commission under the 7<sup>th</sup> Framework Program and with the European Space Agency. In the same context the EDA is developing military requirements which can be taken on board for programs, which so far are only focusing on civilian users. See Alexander Weis, *Improving Capabilities for ESDP*, 109.

<sup>83</sup> Volker Heise, *10 Jahre ESVP*, 31.

The following recommendations and perspectives might help to reduce the outlined deficiencies, to close the gap between demands of the ESS and the current reality in the main field of capability development.

A serious push for urgent action on the key military capability gaps is needed. The transition from analysis and assessment to actual actions should be sped with an agreement on further concrete plans for fixing the most glaring deficiencies. The capability initiatives declared in December 2008 require consequent action and are a first step in the right direction. Pooling resources und sharing capabilities should be established as a real priority. A cooperative option for a major spending decision on military capabilities should be a primary focus and should have priority in regard to spending options on purely national projects.<sup>84</sup>

Strides could be made if individual member states concentrate on specific capabilities and pull resources from others or abandon them totally. Thus, change encompasses a reversal from the ‘All-round Force’ approach for every single member state. EDA can play a supporting role in helping member states to get defense budgets spent on the right things. However, as an instrument of the member states, the EDA is bound by the decisions of these states. Success depends on how individual member states pursue EU goals and direct their national goals accordingly.<sup>85</sup>

Fully maximizing the restricted defense budgets of individual member states resources requires fixing a proportion of national defense budgets for resources, representing a common financing pool of the European partners. This is not only a task of Defense Ministers but a

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<sup>84</sup> Nick Witney, *Re-energizing ESDP*, 7.

<sup>85</sup> Joachim Rohde, Thomas Bauer, “Die Entwicklung der militärischen Fähigkeiten in Europa unter Berücksichtigung der Europäischen Verteidigungsagentur,” in: *Militärische Aspekte der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik im Lichte der deutschen EU- Ratspräsidentschaft*, ed. Franco Algeri, Sibylle Lang, Michael Staack (Bremen 2008: Schriftenreihe WIFIS Band 26), 59.

responsibility of the Heads of State who signed the ESS. The leaders should guide such an obligation and should consider ordering fundamental defense reviews.<sup>86</sup>

Improvements of civilian capabilities can be achieved by taking concrete measures. These measures should enhance training curricula, comprehensive civil- military exercises and startup kits for rapid deployment. Financial incentives are necessary to make deployment more attractive, as would career advantages and planning improvements by national rosters of standing teams for civilian experts. Furthermore, there is a significant need for warehousing of material stocks (armored cars, communication assets etc.).<sup>87</sup>

Finally, the Lisbon Treaty includes regulations which could provide further impetus. Regarding military capabilities, the so called ‘permanent structured cooperation’ in the Lisbon Treaty could be of value.<sup>88</sup> Basically, the concept foresees the possibility of closer cooperation for those member states that are willing and able to undertake greater efforts in the realm of military capabilities.<sup>89</sup> The concrete facilitation of ‘permanent structured cooperation’ is still open to negotiations. Member states and task forces in Brussels are currently discussing pertinent responsibilities. How this discussion will foster coordinated action and coordination of national elements of power is yet to be seen. As with all decisions within the EU, the concrete facilitation depends on the individual will and abilities of member states.

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<sup>86</sup> Nick Witney, *Re-energizing ESDP*, 7.

<sup>87</sup> Juha Auvinen, Richard Wright, *What Ambitions for the Civilian ESDP?*, 111 – 112.

<sup>88</sup> Council of the European Union, *Treaty of Lisbon*, Art. 27 (6), 31.

<sup>89</sup> Christian Mölling, “*ESDP after Lisbon: More Coherent and More Capable?*” in: *CSS Analyses in Security Policy*, ed. Center for Security Studies (CSS), Vol. 3, No 28 (Zürich, February 2008), 2.

## Operations and Missions

According to Xymena Kurowska, “Operations present the most significant, if not the defining feature, of the ESDP.”<sup>90</sup> The operational record represents a concrete component of EU crisis management visible to the international community. Operations and missions are somehow the test in practice of what the ESS demands of a global security actor. In this context, ESDP engagements are conducted with high expectations and anticipation for mission success.

The chosen criterion to assess ESDP operations and missions is their contribution to the EU as a global security actor. This is the basis to describe the current situation, to analyze deficiencies and to outline recommendations and perspectives. The assessment will not focus on every single ESDP operation and mission but will look at ESDP operations and mission as a whole.

From a quantitative perspective, the number of ESDP-led military operations and civilian missions is substantial. Since its first action on the ground which started only in 2003 the EU has undertaken twenty-two ESDP engagements (six military operations and sixteen civilian and civil-military missions) with a total deployment of over 20,000 soldiers and civilian experts. Ten of these engagements have already been successfully completed. Two military operations and ten civilian and civil-military missions are currently ongoing.<sup>91</sup> As Maria Raquel Freire notes, “Thus, in a short period the EU has gained considerable experience in international crisis management.”<sup>92</sup>

ESDP operations and missions cover meanwhile a wide spectrum of engagements. In many cases ESDP operations and missions originated from previous political and developmental

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<sup>90</sup> Xymena Kurowska, “*The Role of ESDP Operations*,” in: *European Security and Defense Policy. An Implementation Report*, ed. Michael Merlingen, Rasa Ostrauskaitė (New York 2008), 26.

<sup>91</sup> Overview of military operations and civilian missions see Appendix C.

<sup>92</sup> Maria Raquel Freire, “*The European Security and Defense Policy, History, Structures and Capabilities*,” in: *European Security and Defense Policy. An Implementation Report*, ed. Michael Merlingen, Rasa Ostrauskaitė (New York 2008), 19.



engagements of the EU in advance (for example, in the Balkans, in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in the Middle East). In addition, ESDP engagements took place in support of a takeover of a United Nations (UN) or NATO engagement such as the 2004 follow on of NATO's SFOR mission in Bosnia through EUFOR ALTHEA or the 2003 UN International Police Task Force in Bosnia through the EU Police Mission. In some cases the individual ESDP action was conducted based on a request from a nation or the UN such as the EU operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006 (EUFOR RD CONGO) at the request of the UN.<sup>93</sup>

In summary ESDP operations and missions include currently many different types including monitoring and surveillance (Balkans, Indonesia, Georgia), border posts (Rafah-Palestine), police training and reinforcement (Afghanistan, Bosnia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Palestine), reform of security forces (Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau), rule of law (Iraq and Kosovo) and protection of shipping against piracy (off the coast of Somalia).<sup>94</sup>

Military operations gave the ESDP step by step an increasing profile by taking successively more responsibility and by exploring new ground. The Council Secretariat has played some kind of an entrepreneurial role. Functionaries in the office of Javier Solana described it as, "We make it up as we go, we deploy a mission to then stimulate our own ability to deploy missions."<sup>95</sup> With the deployment in Macedonia of CONCORDIA in 2003 (comprising about 400 troops), the EU demonstrated for the first time that it could mount a military peacekeeping operation. EUFOR ALTHEA, launched in 2004, showed off the growing role of the EU in Bosnia as it deployed 7,000 troops. And operation ARTEMIS, launched in 2003, showed that the ESDP

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<sup>93</sup> Sibylle Lang, *ESVP*, 237-238.

<sup>94</sup> General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, "Editorial," in: *European Security and Defense Policy 1999 – 2009*, ESDP Newsletter, special issue (Brussels, October 2009), 5.

<sup>95</sup> Xymena Kurowska, *The Role of ESDP Operations*, 28 and footnote 7.

can function autonomously without NATO support under ‘Berlin Plus.’<sup>96</sup> In addition, ARTEMIS was the first military ESDP mission outside Europe. Hence, it demonstrated that ESDP had evolved from a regional crisis management device confined to Europe to an actor with global security ambitions.<sup>97</sup>

The number of civilian ESDP missions has rocketed over the last few years and represents a significant part of the ESDP. The dynamism of the civilian ESDP, then, is explained by the fact that civilian missions are a comparatively easy option for advancing the security profile of the EU. Military troop deployments are quite difficult to agree on and high-end military operations require capabilities not yet available under the ESDP, as outlined in the preceding chapter.<sup>98</sup>

Recent engagements under the ESDP reflect new ground and further challenges. On December 9<sup>th</sup>, 2008, the first military maritime operation of the EU (ATALANTA), commenced. This mission represents the European contribution to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia with some 1,800 soldiers deployed.<sup>99</sup> The mission shows that the EU through ESDP is a useful contributor specifically through successful implementation of the necessary legal framework in regard to deal with piracy. The rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO) which reached full operational capability on April 6<sup>th</sup>, 2009 is also new ground for the ESDP. The mission of EULEX is to assist the authorities of Kosovo in establishing a judiciary, police force and customs service and helping them meet the EU’s rule-of-law standards. With up to 1,950 civilian experts and about 800 local servants, EULEX is so far the largest civilian ESDP mission

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<sup>96</sup> Xymena Kurowska, *The Role of ESDP Operations*, 34.

<sup>97</sup> Maria Raquel Freire, *The European Security and Defense Policy*, 20.

<sup>98</sup> Xymena Kurowska, *The Role of ESDP Operations*, 34.

<sup>99</sup> Auswärtiges Amt, *ESDP*, 29.

and is the first vested with an executive mandate. For the first time U.S. personnel (eighty police officers and eight lawyers) is taking part under the lead of Europeans.<sup>100</sup>

Given this background, how can ESDP operations and missions be evaluated in supporting the EU's contributions as an actor in global security initiatives?

In the beginning, ESDP engagement was largely limited to the western Balkans, the most pressing region in regards to European security. The ESDP area of operations has since expanded world-wide to include not only the Balkans but also the Near and Middle East, Africa and Asia. Thus, the ESDP is now globally oriented. The success of the ESDP missions and operations can be seen in the way that the number and execution of its missions solidified the reputation of the EU as an international actor in international security matters. According to Xymena Kurowska, "ESDP operations have served the political aim of actively fostering a certain image of the EU, which Brussels can now capitalize on. The tangible, high-profile presence on the ground has enhanced the EU's international political status and influence."<sup>101</sup>

Although, the output of an ESDP engagement sometimes is primarily symbolic, there is a more basic point to make. As Michael Merlingen and others note, "Irrespective of whether they engender material or symbolic effects the EU evolved a European way of doing crisis management."<sup>102</sup>

In 2007, Javier Solana remarked in Berlin that, "Combined, the operations represent a significant engagement by the EU on the key stability challenges. And where we have acted we

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<sup>100</sup> Voker Heise, *10 Jahre ESVP*, 26.

<sup>101</sup> Xymena Kurowska, *The Role of ESDP Operations*, 39.

<sup>102</sup> "Official EU discourse highlights this *differentia specifica*, and the scholarly literature tends to agree that the Union is a unique international security player, though this consensus melts away when it comes to identifying the reasons for this state of affairs." See Michael Merlingen, Rasa Ostrauskaitė, "The Implementation of ESDP – Issues and Tentative Generalizations," in: *European Security and Defense Policy. An Implementation Report*, ed. Michael Merlingen, Rasa Ostrauskaitė (New York 2008), 203.

have succeeded. We have helped governments take forward their peace process and we have helped make those processes more sustainable by strengthening their institutions.”<sup>103</sup>

Regardless, of these positive aspects, deficiencies do exist. ESDP operations and missions have so far had only limited scope. Specifically, the successful completions of deployments depended on the limited duration and operational areas of missions. As Nick Witney outlines, “Operations launched with limited objectives and clear timeframe have achieved what they set out to do.”<sup>104</sup> However, Nick Witney notes, “The issue with this operational record as a whole is its lack of ambition.”<sup>105</sup> The EU has so far acted through ESDP only as a niche actor by matching commitments with capabilities.<sup>106</sup>

Furthermore, the ESDP is, according to Grevi, Lynch and Missiroli of the International Institute for Security Studies (ISS), still “untested across the full spectrum of peace support operations.”<sup>107</sup> So far no high end military engagements at the upper end of the spectrum of the ‘Petersberg Tasks’ have been conducted. The EU was never confronted by the unexpected on a large scale during ESDP actions. Likewise, there has not been a situation that required ‘Rapid Decision Making’ (for instance a response to a significant attack on EU-Forces).<sup>108</sup> It remains to be determined if the ESDP decision-making and deployment process could function in extreme crisis.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Bastian Giegerich, Charles Orlianges, Sammi Sandawi, “*Operative Tendenzen der ESVP*,” in: *Militärische Aspekte der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik im Lichte der deutschen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft*, ed. Franco Algieri, Sibylle Lang, Michael Staack (Bremen 2008, Schriftenreihe WIFIS Band 26), 35.

<sup>104</sup> Nick Witney, *Re-energizing ESDP*, 41.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>106</sup> Maria Raquel Freire, *The European Security and Defense Policy*, 20.

<sup>107</sup> Cited in Sibylle Lang, *ESVP*, 238 and footnote 999.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, 239 and 245.

<sup>109</sup> Bastian Giegerich, Charles Orlianges, Sammi Sandawi, *Operative Tendenzen der ESVP*, 44.

The successful deployment of the ESDP so far also represents a dilemma for the EU. The EU is increasingly seen as a global actor and there is greater demand for EU forces for crisis management. The available civil and military capabilities however, are still limited. The desired force numbers, have not been met as outlined in Headline Goals and demanded by the ESS. Hence, the disparity between the EU's self-confident ambitions as a global actor in security matters and its available means remains.<sup>110</sup>

So far the EU has no clearly articulated priorities for its ESDP operations.<sup>111</sup> Furthermore, there is not a nascent strategy for the varied regional areas of operation. The EU cannot continue, with regard to increasing and varied regional conflicts, to operate in an ad hoc manner. These actions threaten to overextend the EU and the resulting mission failure might result in a loss of reputation.

Under the ESS's overall objective of coherence and coordination for all EU instruments two aspects are of significance in regard to ESDP operations and missions. First, there is a desire to improve the cohesion of civil - military instruments within the structures of the Council Secretariat especially in the field of planning and conducting ESDP missions and operations. Second, there is the intention to increase the coherence of crisis management instruments between the first (CFSP/ESDP) and the second pillar (EU Commission).<sup>112</sup>

Within the structures of the Council Secretariat, decision making processes for the conduct of ESDP operations and missions remain intergovernmental. The need for unanimous

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<sup>110</sup> Bastian Giegerich, Charles Orlianges, Sammi Sandawi, *Operative Tendenzen der ESVP*, 44.

<sup>111</sup> Volker Perthes, "Europäischer Lernprozess," in: *Handelsblatt No. 4* (Stuttgart, 3. Februar 2009).

<sup>112</sup> The EU attempts via the Civil Military Coordination (CMCO) concept to increase the coordination between civil and military instruments. This is reflected in the 2003 European Council's definition: "CMCO in the context of CFSP/ESDP addresses the need for effective coordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU's response to crisis." See Joachim Gutow, Reinhardt Rummel, Hannah Whitney-Steele, "Zivil-militärische Koordinierung (CMCO) und ihre Entwicklungsperspektive," in: *Militärische Aspekte der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik im Lichte der deutschen EU- Ratspräsidentschaft*, ed. Franco Algieri, Sibylle Lang, Michael Staack (Bremen 2008: Schriftenreihe WIFIS Band 26), 114.

decisions hinders the efficiency of the process. The complex structures render the decision-making process long and arduous.<sup>113</sup> Nevertheless, there has been significant progress in regard to planning- and command structures for civilian missions and military operations.<sup>114</sup> What is still missing is the merging of civilian and military structures at the strategic level. As Nick Witney notes, “The persistent division between civilian and military planning and direction represent the anthesis of the integrated approach which is supposed to be the EU’s strength.”<sup>115</sup>

However, the European Council in December 2008 was able to take a further step toward enhancing the efficiency of the EU’s crisis management activities by endorsing a mandate for the further development of the EU’s civil-military planning capabilities. According to Clemens von Götze, “This will entail the setting-up of a crisis-management and planning directorate responsible not only for the political and strategic planning of both civilian missions and military operations but also conceptual or fundamental questions pertaining to the ESDP.”<sup>116</sup> With such a directorate, the EU could uniquely institutionalize a comprehensive approach. Discussions on the implementation are ongoing in the framework of the complex implementation process of the Lisbon Treaty as a whole. Beside the political strategic level there is still a separation of the

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<sup>113</sup> Nicolai von Ondarza, *Die EU-Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik im Schatten der Ungewissheit*, ed. Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Studie 27 (Berlin, Oktober 2008), 9 and footnote 17.

<sup>114</sup> The EU so far does not have its own Operational Headquarters. However, five nationally-provided Operation Headquarters are available for commanding military ESDP missions (in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Greece) and can be staffed with personnel from the EU member states upon activation. In addition, NATO makes its SHAPE headquarters available for EU operations that are to be carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities under ‘Berlin Plus.’ Moreover the EU has since July 1<sup>st</sup>, 2007 its own Operations Center that can command military operations or civil military missions of limited size. Furthermore the EU has since July 2007 a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) to command all civilian missions through a Civilian Operations Commander who was nominated in March 2008. See Auswärtiges Amt, *ESDP*, 19–25.

<sup>115</sup> Nick Witney, *Re-energizing ESDP*, 48.

<sup>116</sup> Clemens von Götze, *The Future of ESDP – Ways to improve European Security and Defense Policy*, Speech held in front of the WEU European Security and Defense Assembly, (Paris, 2 June 2009). [http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/presse/articles/2009/vonGOETZE\\_improve\\_ESDP\\_2009.pdf?PHPSESSID=f3137d60](http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/presse/articles/2009/vonGOETZE_improve_ESDP_2009.pdf?PHPSESSID=f3137d60) – accessed 28 November 2009.

Operational Headquarters for military and civilian missions. Initiatives for closer coordination require further contemplation.<sup>117</sup>

The coordination and harmonization of the first and second pillars is a primary way for assuring coherent EU representation to the international community. As Maria Raquel Freire writes, “In principle one of the key strength of the EU is its panoply of foreign policy instruments which can be used to create maximum impact.”<sup>118</sup> The spectrum of EU civilian tools is not restricted to civilian missions within the framework of the ESDP. Additionally, instruments such as neighborhood and development policy, the stability instrument and enlargement within the EU Commission are available. With these policies the EU can foster overall regional security and stability as well as crisis management.

Thus, the EU has the tools to address all phases of conflict, from prevention to conflict resolution and civil reconstruction.<sup>119</sup> Interaction and coherence between the ESDP missions and operations and the tools of the Commission increasingly improve.<sup>120</sup> However, in different areas of operation the EU is still acting not coherent enough.<sup>121</sup> Thus, valuable synergistic effects are lost due to insufficient coordination by the EU Council Secretariat and the Commission with regard to crisis management. Furthermore, the EU’s pillar structure clashes with the logic of civil-military interaction.<sup>122</sup> Hence, in general, coordination is still a challenge. In practice, sometimes

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<sup>117</sup> Volker Heise, *10 Jahre ESVP*, 30.

<sup>118</sup> Maria Raquel Freire, *The European Security and Defense Policy*, 21.

<sup>119</sup> Clemens von Götze, *Die Europäische Union*, 2 and 11.

<sup>120</sup> For example at the after mass of the military operation Concordia in December 2005 a ‘Policy Advisory Team (EUPAT)’ was engaged which prepared the takeover by the EU Commission. See Bastian Giegerich, Charles Orlianges, Sammi Sandawi, *Operative Tendenzen der ESVP*, 32.

<sup>121</sup> This is the case in Afghanistan where EUPOL AFGHANISTAN is an ESDP trainer mission for police officers. Parallel the EU Commission supports the built up of the Afghan police, the law and order trust fund (LOFTA) and contributed for additional measures 610 million EUR between the years of 2007-2010. Although the measures are unanimously, the coordination between EU Commissions programs and the ESDP mission is difficult. See Nicolai von Ondarza, *Die EU-Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik*, 9-10.

<sup>122</sup> Alexander Weis, *Improving Capabilities for ESDP’s Future Needs*, 109.

institutional rivalry between the EU Commission and the ESDP and bureaucratic infighting undermine the unity of purpose and the coherence of EU foreign policy.<sup>123</sup>

Hence, in summary what has been achieved in the main field of ESDP operations and missions is considerable but not yet sufficient to meet the requirement of a global security actor. The following recommendations and perspectives might help to reduce the deficiencies outlined above to close the gap between the demands of the ESS and the current reality in the main field of ESDP operations and missions.

Clear priorities for ESDP engagements are necessary to avoid an overstretch of available resources. This is first and foremost a political decision. That is the responsibility of the member states and difficult to achieve because of often divergent interests. However, a more detailed strategic lay down of what the EU wants to achieve is important. This could be achieved by developing regional strategies and a European doctrine for crisis management, from preventive engagement and peacemaking to post-conflict reconstruction.<sup>124</sup> This would also help to generate pressure for the capabilities needed. So long as the necessary capabilities remain unavailable the EU should stick to a realistic approach for ESDP operations and missions to be a credible and reliable partner also in the eyes of international partners.

Hence, in the nearer future such engagements should focus mostly on post conflict and stabilization operations as well as specific niche engagements. In this context, the comparative advantage of the EUs crisis management functions should be exploited to the greatest extent possible. In this area, the ESDP can offer unique tools not available to other actors. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the EU should abandon its ambitions. They do however have to be realistic and clearly articulated in a timely manner. In this context, it is of utmost importance not to neglect the aspect of military procurement which can be costly and sometimes involve a

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<sup>123</sup> Maria Raquel Freire, *The European Security and Defense Policy*, 21.

<sup>124</sup> Nick Whitney, *Re-energizing ESDP*, 42 - 43.



painful series of compromises. ESDP has to envisage not just peace-keeping, but also if necessary peace-making – the separation of warring factions by force - as outlined in the extended ‘Petersberg Tasks.’ As Nick Witney rightly points out, “It would be wrong to assume that such a need will never arise again, optimism is no base for policy.”<sup>125</sup>

A fully integrated civilian – military EU Headquarters in Brussels would be the logical next step in the process of unifying strategic planning under a new crisis management and planning directorate. Such a civil-military Operational Headquarters would be responsible for all EU operations, both civil and military (except the most demanding military operations where it would make sense to use NATO facilities).<sup>126</sup> This would enable unity of command and the planning would from the beginning be on an integrated civil – military basis. This reflects the EUs comprehensive understanding of crisis management, simultaneously deploying military forces, police and other civilian experts in restoring public administration and the rule of law.<sup>127</sup>

Acknowledging shortcomings in the coordination between the ESDP and the EU Commission, the Lisbon Treaty includes regulations for improvement. The EU abandons the pillar structure between the EU Commission and the CFSP/ESDP. This involves the new post of

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<sup>125</sup> Nick Witney, *Re-energizing ESDP*, 12.

<sup>126</sup> The discussion concerning an autonomous EU Operational Headquarters is very controversial and sensitive. During the so called “Chocolate Summit” Germany, France, Belgium and Luxemburg in April 2003 proposed an own Operational EU Headquarters, which was strongly rejected by the United Kingdom and the United States seen as an unnecessary duplication with NATO. The headquarters question is still seen as the “Rubicon” for a more independent ESDP. However the old arguments are outdated and should be replaced by pragmatic solutions. A military - civilian headquarters for the EU would be something “sui generis” which is unique and would not duplicate NATO Headquarters. Who wants more responsibility for ESDP and the ability to act independent and efficient in limited scale to use the unique advantages of the ESDP should accept such a headquarters. In regard to these arguments see also Nick Witney, *Re-energizing ESDP*, 48-49. An encompassing discussion of command and control issues for ESDP operations and missions is included in Luis Simon, *Command and Control? Planning for EU Military Operations*, ed. EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Occasional Paper No. 81 (Paris, January 2010).

<sup>127</sup> Nick Witney, *Re-energizing ESDP*, 48-49.

a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is at the same time the Vice President of the EU Commission.<sup>128</sup>

It is the task of the holder of this new office of the foreign minister to implement a unified foreign policy.<sup>129</sup> This foreign policy will be supported by a European External Action Service (EEAS) to be created by merging the external relations staff of the Council with its counterpart in the EU Commission and by adding diplomats of the member states. In Maria Raquel Freires judgment, “Taken together, these measures would go a long way toward translating the Union’s potential for foreign policy strength – its impressive array of policy tools – into reality.”<sup>130</sup>

### **Strategic Partnership with NATO and the Transatlantic Dimension**

Another main field of action of the ESDP is focused on working with partners like the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union (AU) and NATO or other bilateral relations. The implementation report of the ESS calls specifically for deepening the strategic partnership with NATO.<sup>131</sup> This is the criterion used to analyze what the ESDP has achieved so far in this main field of action looking first of all at the current situation followed by a description of existing deficiencies and finally outlining recommendations and perspectives.

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<sup>128</sup> Council of the European Union, *Treaty of Lisbon*, Art. 9E, 13A, 14, 19.

<sup>129</sup> At the informal meeting on November 19<sup>th</sup>, 2009, ahead of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on December 1<sup>st</sup>, 2009, EU Heads of State or Government agreed on the appointment of Ms. Catherine Ashton (UK) as the first High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the EU Commission. She took over the responsibilities of Javier Solana who was the High Representative of the CFSP and Secretary General of the Council Secretariat since 1999. See General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Background Paper, *The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / The European External Action Service* (Brussels, November 2009), 1. [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111301.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111301.pdf) - accessed 18 January 2010.

<sup>130</sup> Maria Raquel Freire, *The European Security and Defense Policy*, 22.

<sup>131</sup> Council of the European Union, *Report on the Implementation of the ESS*, 4 and 16.

The EU-NATO relationship matters because of the strategic importance of the transatlantic relationship, not least because NATO remains the guarantor of European security for its member states. According to Daniel Keohane, “This has made the EU’s relationship with NATO a much more strategic and political challenge than the EU’s interaction with other international organizations.”<sup>132</sup> Of the factors affecting a strategic partnership of the ESDP with NATO, the underlying transatlantic partnership is the most significant. Hence, the attitude of the United States toward the ESDP is a determining factor.

In principle the United States wants a strong European partner to help manage the new security threats, most of which emanate from beyond Europe’s borders.<sup>133</sup> However, since the beginning of the ESDP Washington has not wanted to see the ESDP evolve in a way that would undermine NATO and has reacted strongly to any attempt to develop an autonomous capability not closely linked to NATO.<sup>134</sup> The main concern was that the ESDP could lead to duplication at the expense of NATO and U.S. leadership of the Alliance and moreover that the ESDP demands would siphon resources away from national efforts to meet NATO requirements.<sup>135</sup> The United States was skeptical whether the ESDP is NATO’s companion or competitor.<sup>136</sup> However, according to Asle Toje, there is a new sense in America that the EU’s efforts should be nurtured rather than contained. As he notes, “It seems assurance that a stronger EU defense policy will

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<sup>132</sup> Daniel Keohane, “*ESDP and NATO*,” in: *European Security and Defense Policy – the First 10 Years (1999 – 2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, Daniel Keohane, EU Institute for Security Studies (Paris 2009), 127.

<sup>133</sup> Stephen F. Larrabee, “*The United States and the Evolution of ESDP*,” in: *What Ambitions for European Defense in 2020?*, ed. Alvaro de Vasconcelos EU Institute for Security Studies (Paris 2009), 45.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>135</sup> Esther Brimmer, *Seeing Blue. American Visions of the European Union*, Chaillot Paper No. 105, ed. EU Institute for Security Studies (Paris 2007), 19.

<sup>136</sup> Over the past decade, the United States has supported the ESDP as a means to develop security capabilities, under the condition that ESDP avoid the 3 Ds outlined by then Secretary of State Madleine Albright in 1998: decoupling (from NATO strategy and decision making), duplication (of NATO structures and resources) and discrimination (against non-EU members of NATO). See Derek Mix, “*NATO – EU Relations*,” in: *NATO’s 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Summit*, ed. Paul Belkin, DOC 7-5700 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 20 March 2009), 11. See also footnote No. 20 of the monograph.

complement rather than compete with NATO has gone some way towards persuading U.S.-decision makers.”<sup>137</sup> Stephen Larrabee sees the current situation also as a ‘wind of change’ stating, “In the last years, U.S. attitudes towards the ESDP have begun to shift in a more positive direction.”<sup>138</sup> Nick Witney argues in the same direction, “The United States is now calling for an ESDP ‘with teeth’, contradicting the argument that a stronger European defense means a weakened Atlantic alliance.”<sup>139</sup> This is also reflected in the voice of the then U.S. Ambassador to NATO Victoria Nuland stating during a speech to the Paris Press Club in February 2008, “Europe needs, the United States needs, NATO needs, the democratic world needs – a stronger more capable European defense capacity.”<sup>140</sup> This ‘wind of change’, which reflects a more complementary understanding of the ESDP and NATO, can be explained by several reasons.

First, years of cooperation in the Balkans among the United States, the EU, NATO, the UN and other actors has helped to improve some Americans’ perception of the EU.<sup>141</sup> Second, ESDP with its increasing operational activities can act also with limited military capabilities or through civilian missions where the United States or NATO as a whole has no interest to be involved or it would be politically difficult for the Alliance or the United States to engage.<sup>142</sup> Third, military capabilities of the EU will remain limited in the foreseeable future, thus not

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<sup>137</sup> Asle Toje, *The EU NATO and European Defense – A Slow Train Coming*, ed. EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Occasional Paper No. 74 (Paris, December 2008), 14.

<sup>138</sup> Stephen F. Larrabee, *The United States and the Evolution of ESDP*, 46.

<sup>139</sup> Nick Witney, *Re-energizing ESDP*, 2.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., cited on page 2 and footnote 1.

<sup>141</sup> Esther Brimmer, *Seeing Blue. American Visions of the European Union*, 19.

<sup>142</sup> An Example is the deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia after the Russian Georgian border conflict in August 2008 where the EU deployment was instrumental in consolidating a ceasefire and promoting transparency in a country that is an important partner of NATO. Further examples are the limited military ESDP operations EUFOR RD CONGO 2006 and EUFOR TCHAD 2008 in which the United States did not want to get involved and the EU acted independently from NATO. See Jamie Shea, “Ten Years of ESDP: A NATO Perspective,” in: *European Security and Defense Policy 1999 – 2009*, ESDP Newsletter, special issue, ed. General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (Brussels October 2009), 44 and Stephen F. Larrabee, *The United States and the Evolution of ESDP*, 49.

develop into a serious competitor to NATO. Fourth, in terms of the ESS, the ESDP is not designed to become a countervailing power to the United States and NATO and the latter will remain the basis of collective defense in the years to come.<sup>143</sup> Fifth, after years of denigrating ESDP, U.S. officials have begun to recognize that the EU, with its emphasis on civilian capabilities, its civil – military approach and its wide spectrum of crisis management tools, has something to offer even if it cannot contribute much to dealing with conflicts on the high end of the conflict spectrum.<sup>144</sup>

According to Xymena Kurowska, “The United States has evolved into an important backer of the ESDP. It now sees the ESDP as instrumental in cases when its status as the sole superpower and its correlated international image prevents it from effective crisis management.”<sup>145</sup> In this regard the EU is seen as more adequate, preaching the same values but less confrontationally, which makes its involvement in certain regions more acceptable.<sup>146</sup>

Moreover, there is on both sides of the Atlantic a common understanding that the complex security challenges of the twenty-first century cannot be solved by one player alone and by military means only.<sup>147</sup> This is reflected during the speech of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

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<sup>143</sup> Franco Algieri, “Die Außen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der Europäischen Union,” in: *Die Europäische Union – Politisches System und Politikbereiche*, ed. Werner Weidenfeld, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Bonn 2008), 470.

<sup>144</sup> Stephen F. Larrabee, *The United States and the Evolution of ESDP*, 46.

<sup>145</sup> Xymena Kurowska, *The Role of ESDP Operations*, 39.

<sup>146</sup> Palestine is a case in point. The U.S. lobbied for the EU Rafah Border Assistance Mission, in 2005, with Secretary of State, Ms Condoleeza Rice, actively participating in the negotiations between the EU and Israel on the ESDP deployment. See Xymena Kurowska, *The Role of ESDP Operations*, 40.

<sup>147</sup> According to Asle Toje, “What we are seeing is the convergence of two dominant agendas in American foreign policy thinking. One favors continued American engagement in European security through NATO; the other sees the EU emerging as a power in its own right as the best long term strategy to ease Americas burden in an increasingly multipolar world. Although there often contrasting perspectives they occasionally overlap. The current coherence stems from a shared understanding that U.S. political and military resources in the years ahead will face a new set of challenges beyond Europe, and in order to face these challenges effectively America will need both greater flexibility and more able partners The EU is seen as a catalyst for both.” Asle Toje, *The EU NATO and European Defense – A Slow Train Coming*, ed. EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Occasional Paper No. 74 (Paris, December 2008), 14.

in front of the U.S. Foreign Relations Council in July 2009 as she stated, “With more states facing common challenges, we have the chance, and a profound responsibility, to exercise American leadership to solve problems in concert with others. No nation can meet the world’s challenges alone.”<sup>148</sup> The ESS outlines a similar expression noting, “No single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems entirely on its own.”<sup>149</sup> In this regard Jamie Shea presents a compelling argument for the need for close cooperation between NATO and EU stating, “As the response to new security challenges like proliferation, cyber defense, energy supplies has perforce to be complex, a joined-up approach between NATO and the EU will become even more important if the values of North America and Europe are to prevail in a multi-polar world where power is moving towards Asia.”<sup>150</sup>

Since his 2008 election, President Obama has continued with a constructive attitude towards ESDP.<sup>151</sup> According to Daniel Keohane, “EU and NATO leaders understand that stronger cooperation between NATO and the EU would greatly help the United States and Europeans work together more effectively.”<sup>152</sup> Another positive condition for enhancing the EU - NATO cooperation was the reintegration of France in the integrated military structures of NATO in April 2009. President Sarkozy introduced a new transatlantic policy arguing that Europe cannot achieve much in the world without good relations with the United States which has helped transform the tone of the EU - NATO relationship. Hence, the former Franco-American tensions over the roles of the EU and NATO have rescinded significantly.<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> Cited in Derek Reveron, “Obama’s National Security Strategy Unfolding,” in: *New Atlanticist – Policy and Analysis Blog* (Washington D.C. 16 July 2009). [http://www.acus.org/new\\_atlanticist/obamas-national-security-strategy-unfolding](http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/obamas-national-security-strategy-unfolding) - accessed 18 January 2010.

<sup>149</sup> Council of the European Union, *ESS - A Secure Europe in a Better World*, 2.

<sup>150</sup> Jamie Shea, *Ten Years of ESDP: A NATO Perspective*, 45.

<sup>151</sup> Daniel Keohane, *ESDP and NATO*, 134.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, 134.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, 135.

Behind this background of a favorable context for EU - NATO cooperation it is helpful to look at the current situation. The formal strategic partnership agreement 'Berlin Plus' allows the EU assured access to NATO planning capabilities and assets. This agreement was successfully implemented with the EU Mission in the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (CONCORDIA from March – December 2003) and the military EU operation in Bosnia (EUFOR ALTHEA since December 2004). 'Berlin Plus' has shown to work well. Informal political contact along with pragmatism on the ground did help to slowly develop EU - NATO cooperation in countries where both organizations work side by side.

In Afghanistan, during 2005 and 2006, the value of a greater civil contribution from the EU, including a potential role for the ESDP, was becoming increasingly apparent in the United States and NATO.<sup>154</sup> Today EUPOL AFGHANISTAN works alongside the NATO operation ISAF in developing the key area of police training and the EU Commission provides significant funding to non-military activities, such as judges, aid workers and administrators, within NATO's provincial reconstruction teams.<sup>155</sup> In Kosovo EU and NATO have worked closely together since 1999 and the current civilian ESDP mission EULEX KOSOVO is marked by fruitful pragmatic cooperation with NATO's KFOR operation.<sup>156</sup>

As Jamie Shea notes, "EU capabilities have become the necessary complement to engagements of the Alliance in nearly all of the NATO operations and it is difficult to envisage a major NATO operation these days in which the EU would not also be present in a significant complementary role."<sup>157</sup> Or as James Dobbins has pointed out, that it is NATO that needs the EU assistance to successfully execute many of the tasks that it called upon to perform today. He

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<sup>154</sup> James Dobbins, *NATO Peacekeepers Need a Partner*, *International Herald Tribune* (New York, 30 September 2005).

<sup>155</sup> Jamie Shea, *Ten Years of ESDP: A NATO Perspective*, 44.

<sup>156</sup> Auswärtiges Amt, *ESDP*, 37.

<sup>157</sup> Jamie Shea, *Ten Years of ESDP: A NATO Perspective*, 45.

further notes, “It is quite possible to envisage an EU-led operation completed without the involvement of NATO. However, it is necessarily impossible to imagine a nation-building operation being completed by NATO without the involvement of the EU.”<sup>158</sup>

Furthermore, the day-to-day cooperation between EU and NATO has improved.<sup>159</sup> Elements to enhance the dialogue like liaison staffs, common working groups like the EU- NATO Capability Group and regular staff-to-staff talks are in place. The NATO Secretary General is also more and more involved in meetings of EU Foreign and Defense Ministers, in the same way the President of the EU Commission and the High Representative Solana attended NATO Summits.

Although substantial dialogue between the two organizations takes place however, these consultations and cooperation are mostly reduced to informal meetings and exchange of information.<sup>160</sup> As encouraging the pragmatic improvements in the field are there are deficiencies to be outlined.

First and foremost, the main obstacle to establishing a true strategic partnership between EU and NATO is the unsolved Turkey – Cyprus problem. Ankara has prevented closer NATO cooperation and blocks all formal agreements for cooperation on the strategic level between EU and NATO be it for operations or in the development of capabilities.<sup>161</sup> Cyprus is a member of the EU but not of the Alliance and has no security agreement with NATO. Hence, the EU and NATO are unable to share sensitive intelligence information, thereby hindering their ability to cooperate on matters of strategic importance and to conclude formal strategic agreements for

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<sup>158</sup> James Dobbins, “*Friends Again?*” in: *Friends Again: EU – U.S. Relations After the Crisis*, ed. Marcin Zaborowski, European Institute for Security Studies (Paris 2006), 26.

<sup>159</sup> Jamie Shea, *Ten Years of ESDP: A NATO Perspective*, 45.

<sup>160</sup> Asle Toje, *The EU NATO and European Defense – A Slow Train Coming*, 21.

<sup>161</sup> Stephen F. Larrabee, *The United States and the Evolution of ESDP*, 51.



operations outside ‘Berlin Plus.’<sup>162</sup> Thus, the cooperation is reduced to ‘pragmatic solutions’ on the working level and in the field and despite a more constructive tone on both sides in Brussels, EU and NATO cooperation is not as effective as it could be.<sup>163</sup>

The political will to co-operate more closely and the pragmatic co-operation in the field where NATO and EU already work together – in parts quite successfully - are not sufficient. So far strategic benefits have resulted often from the happy convergence of independent actions of both EU and NATO. Early coordination and transparency need to be improved, as well as a common understanding of how the different strength of NATO and ESDP can be brought to bear even more beneficially. This mitigates the risk that uncoordinated but similar missions would be launched in the same area which would cause unnecessary duplication of precious assets.

The following recommendations and perspectives might help to reduce the outlined deficiencies. A sustainable and profound improvement of the strategic partnership between EU and NATO can only be achieved if the Turkey - Cyprus dispute is resolved. Although at working level great efforts are made to find solutions, this issue cannot be resolved on the bureaucratic level. It will require high political intervention. The new NATO Secretary General has taken on this issue a particular matter of concern, however, intensive talks with Ankara have yet not been successful to bring convergence. European leaders too will have to show greater flexibility in addressing Turkey’s concerns and to put greater institutional pressure on Greek Cypriots in resolving the Cyprus issue.<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> Turkey objects to Cyprus participating in any NATO-EU discussions that involve sharing intelligence or other sensitive information. With the EU refusing to allow the exclusion of any of its members from such meetings meaningful discussions at the political and strategic level is effectively blocked (beneath the surface of Turkey’s stance are linkages with its protected bid for EU membership and the issue of divided Cyprus). See Derek E. Mix, “*NATO-EU Relations*,” in: *NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit*, ed. Paul Belkin, DOC 7-5700 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 20 March 2009), 11-12.

<sup>163</sup> Daniel Keohane, *ESDP and NATO*, 137.

<sup>164</sup> Stephen F. Larrabee, *The United States and the Evolution of ESDP*, 51.

NATO and EU should develop mechanisms for coordination and political consultations that will in return enable better cooperation between NATO and EU, or the ESDP respectively. This will create transparency and eliminate redundancies. It remains, however, undisputed, that only NATO, with its military integration and the ability to fall back onto military capabilities of the United States is prepared in the foreseeable future for high intensity combat on larger scale. The ESDP in the framework of the EU can provide the strength of civilian – military instruments to including limited military capabilities also available for autonomous engagements.

It would be inadequate to draw a strict line and employ NATO exclusively for military engagements and the EU and ESDP only in cases of civilian missions. This would contradict the justified call from Washington for an ESDP ‘with teeth’ and rule out any action by the EU also with limited military means in those cases where neither NATO nor the United States want to become involved. This is not in the interest of the Europeans, nor of the Americans. What is needed is a flexible set of responses for common crisis management, taking advantage of the respective assets of both organizations. According to the former Secretary General of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “It is becoming increasingly clear that NATO and the EU have specific capabilities that can ultimately promote positive change in crisis regions but only by working together.”<sup>165</sup>

Against this background a functioning ESDP with appropriate military and civilian capabilities together with the military strength of NATO will increase the flexibility to react to developing crises. In other words, the decision to respond to a crisis with either NATO or the ESDP could be based on the political context, the geographic location as well as the military and civilian requirements. Hence, such an option allows for a more flexible response to complex challenges. Wherever NATO or the EU are already engaged, it would be sensible to use the other

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<sup>165</sup> Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, *NATO and the EU: Time for a New Chapter*, Keynote Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer’ (Berlin, 29 January 2007). <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070129b.html> - accessed 22 January 2010.

organization in a supporting role, thus achieving true complementarity of NATO and EU. This avoids a futile ‘beauty contest’ between the two organizations. There is sufficient international disorder to keep both institutions engaged in a coherent manner for years to come without competition.<sup>166</sup>

Naturally, both organizations will remain fully independent with overlapping but not identical functions. Furthermore, that does not mean that the United States and Europeans will always be of the same opinion, but Europeans should be privileged partners the United States should talk to and consult in dealing with security and foreign policy challenges be it through NATO or the EU.<sup>167</sup>

While firm support for a stronger EU role is an encouraging condition, the answers for a stronger necessary European engagement in crisis management are likely to be found in Europe. The success of the venture hinges on the Europeans being able to muster the capabilities that are crucial in delivering United States good will while at the same time strengthening ESDP. The incentives undertaken for deeper defense cooperation among the European member states is the right direction and many in NATO see the EU as a catalyst for mobilizing European military capabilities.<sup>168</sup> As a guiding principle both the EU and the United States should ensure that the ongoing ESDP cooperates closely with NATO and rather strengthens than weakens the transatlantic relations. This is in accordance with what the ESS outlines as, “Where we have worked together, the EU and the United States have been a formidable force for good in the world.”<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> Kenneth Payne, *The European Security and Defense Policy and the Future of NATO*, ed. BBC News Analysis and Research (London 2003), 29.

<sup>167</sup> Sir Michael Arthur, “Die außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Herausforderungen für die USA,” in: *Speech during an expert meeting of the Hans Seidel Stiftung on the topic: Die Außenpolitik Präsident Obamas und die Zukunft der transatlantischen Beziehungen* (Wildbad Kreuth, 26 November 2009), 1.

<sup>168</sup> Asle Toje, *The EU NATO and European Defense – A Slow Train Coming*, 17 and 28.

<sup>169</sup> Council of the European Union, *Report on the Implementation of the ESS*, 4.

## **Conclusions and Perspectives**

Ten years of ESDP is a topic of extensive discussion in literature, with due consideration of the full complexity of the issue. A comprehensive analysis would have gone beyond the scope of this monograph and was not intended as the subject under investigation. The analysis focused on the question, "What has ESDP achieved in its main fields of action (capabilities, operations/missions and strategic partnership with NATO to include transatlantic relations) to meet the requirements of the ESS?" The following conclusions should be seen as qualified against this background. The achievements of the ESDP are measured against chosen criteria derived out of the ESS and the implementation report of the ESS.

With regard to being more capable and to doing more about military and civilian capabilities, in many respects progress has been made over the last ten years. Military and civilian rapid response tools have been established (Battlegroups and Civilian Response Teams), and a European Defense Agency (EDA) is in place to foster pooling and sharing of assets to enhance synergies in capability development. With the declaration on strengthening military capabilities signed in 2008, member states have shown the will to do more on capability development. On the civilian side, steps have been taken to identify relevant personnel for deployment in ESDP missions and to create a pool of readily available experts.

However, there is still a gap between the ambitions outlined in the ESS, respective Headline Goals and the reality of available capabilities. With regard to civilian capabilities, further improvements are necessary to enhance sustainability through financial incentives, provision of equipment and enhancing rapid deployment capabilities. Moreover, military reform in Europe remains a slow process. There is still a lack of military key capabilities such as tactical and strategic airlift and strategic reconnaissance to name but a few. Striving for greater European defense cooperation is necessary and the member states should continue to support the EDA in its effort to lead this process. Behind the background of tight defense budgets, the EU agenda has to

focus on spending the money available more efficiently.<sup>170</sup> Javier Solana is right stating, “We cannot achieve anything without the resources to do the job.”<sup>171</sup>

Operations and missions are the ESDP’s figurehead to be more active, attract international attention and contribute to enable the EU to take responsibility as a global security actor. With twenty-two ESDP operations and missions since the first ESDP operation began in 2003, the footprint is notable. The field of operations almost spans the globe and includes a wide spectrum of engagements covering monitoring and surveillance, border posts, police training and reinforcement, security sector reform, rule of law and protecting ships against piracy. The EU has thus gained considerable experience in international crisis management in a very short time and earned an international reputation.

These operations and missions however, were limited in terms of scope and time. The ESDP has not yet stood the test in high end military operations. In this respect it does not yet fulfill the ambition to perform as a global security actor in the upper spectrum defined in the ‘Petersberg Tasks.’ The ESDP also faces the challenge of an increasing demand for it to act as an international crisis manager. The demands and the expectations raised by its operations should be proportional to the resources that member states have decided to allocate to avoid an overextension of the ESDP. A key question for the future is less about the number of ESDP operations but more about their size, mandate and political ambition. What is needed for the ESDP operations and missions are clear priorities and detailed regional strategies.

In the main field of action, working with partners to deepen the strategic partnership of EU and NATO, it is evident that in principle the United States wishes for a strong European partner and is noticeably more open towards the development of a capable ESDP. The EU/ESDP

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<sup>170</sup> Asle Toje, *The EU NATO and European Defense – A Slow Train Coming*, 27.

<sup>171</sup> Javier Solana, “Ten Years of European Security and Defense Policy,” in: *European Security and Defense Policy 1999 – 2009*, ESDP Newsletter, special issue, ed. General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (Brussels October 2009), 1.

with its civil-military set of tools is increasingly perceived as being added value, able to offer appropriate responses to complex security challenges in a complementary role with NATO. For the United States and for the Europeans it is also an advantage that the ESDP can act with limited scale where the United States or the Alliance cannot or do not wish to become involved. There is already close practical cooperation between NATO and EU/ESDP, be it within the framework of the formal agreement on strategic cooperation such as 'Berlin Plus' (Bosnia, Macedonia) or in the way they work alongside as in Afghanistan and in Kosovo.

Despite the more constructive tone between EU and NATO the cooperation however, is not as effective as it could be and is largely reduced to informal consultations. The unresolved Turkey-Cyprus issue is an obstacle to a true strategic partnership and urgently requires a political solution. In the foreseeable future NATO will remain the basis for the collective security of Europe. Nevertheless, the close cooperation and complementarity of NATO - with its military strength – and the ESDP – in the context of a comprehensive civil-military approach – should be extended. It provides both Europeans and the United States with a more flexible set of responses for crisis management to the benefit of both. In any case, the pull of events, such as Afghanistan, piracy or France's return to NATO's integrated structures, seems to be bringing NATO and the EU/ESDP inexorably closer together.<sup>172</sup>

With regard to increasing coherence, the ESS calls for the effective use of all instruments - civilian and military – that the EU has available. ESDP is not emerging in isolation but is an integral part of the multi-faceted EU approach. This is the added value of the EU. With regard to institutional structures, the implementation of a new crisis management and planning directorate to bring together civilian and military planning capabilities on the political strategic level was initiated. The next logical step would be a civilian – military EU Headquarters to enable unity of command and planning, which would be on an integrated civil – military basis. Moreover, the EU

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<sup>172</sup> Jamie Shea, *Ten Years of ESDP: A NATO Perspective*, 44.

and the member states have launched initiatives to enhance the ‘cross pillar approach’ in order to ensure a more coherent and coordinated use of ESDP capabilities together with civilian capabilities available to the EU Commission.

The Lisbon Treaty, in force since December 1<sup>st</sup>, 2009, will assist the EU and its member states to make more rational use of the EU’s instruments for external relations. It includes regulations for better congruence and further improvement of the ESDP. There is no longer a pillar structure between the EU Commission and CFSP/ESDP. The new High Representative of the CFSP and Vice President of the EU Commission supported by an European External Action Service (EEAS) is responsible for a unified coherent foreign policy. Moreover, the ‘permanent structured cooperation’ mechanism provides a tool for enhancing capability development.<sup>173</sup> It can help to further develop a higher degree of pooling of military assets in that the EDA has already started. However, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty needs time and results can only be expected gradually.

In summary, the ESDP has made significant progress in the main fields of action to meet the requirements of the ESS, but it is still work in progress and, as shown, a lot still needs to be done. However, it is not an exaggeration to call the ESDP a success story thus far, not least when one considers that it was born and developed in turbulent times and at a time of profound change for the EU. The EU’s contribution to international security has substantially increased and improved because of the development of the ESDP over the last ten years. In the words of Javier Solana, writing in 2009, “We have come a long way in developing ESDP as a tool enabling Europe to project itself through action in response to crises. ESDP is no longer an aspiration; it is a reality. The process of moving forward, of evolving and growing stronger has not been as fast as some would have hoped, but it is nevertheless an ever advancing process.”<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>173</sup> Council of the European Union, *Treaty of Lisbon*, Art 9E, 13A, 14, 19 and Art 27 (6), 31.

<sup>174</sup> Javier Solana, “Preface,” in: *What Ambitions for European Defense in 2020?*, 9.

## **APPENDIX A**

### **Timeline of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)**

1 November 1993: Maastricht Treaty, defined the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

4 December 1998: Real starting point of Defense Europe at the France - UK Summit in St.-Malo.

1 May 1999: Entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty incorporating the 'Petersberg Tasks.'

4-5 June 1999: Cologne European Council, launch of ESDP.

10-11 December 1999: Helsinki European Council, decision for autonomous defense capability.

20 June 2000: Feira European Council, key decisions on civilian crisis management.

7-9 December 2000: Nice European Council defined the EU political and military bodies.

16 December 2002: Adoption of the strategic EU and NATO partnership ('Berlin Plus').

1 January 2003: Start of the first ESDP mission, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia (EUPM).

31 March 2003: Start of the first EU Military Operation in Macedonia (CONCORDIA).

12-13 December 2003: European Council, adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS).

17 May 2004: Approval by the EU Council of the 2010 Military Headline Goal.

12 July 2004: Council agreement to Joint Action for the European Defense Agency (EDA).

22 November 2004: Military Capability Commitment Conference – Creation of EU Battlegroups.

16-17 December 2004: Brussels European Council endorsed the Civilian Headline Goal 2008.

November 2007: Decision to adopt a new Civilian Headline Goal 2010.

12 December 2008: European Council, declaration on the strengthening of capabilities.


11-12 December 2008: Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy (ESS).

1 December 2009: Entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

Source: General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, "Timeline," in: *European Security and Defense Policy 1999 – 2009*, ESDP Newsletter, special issue (Brussels 2009), 6-7.



**APPENDIX B**  
**The “Three Pillars” of the European Union**



## APPENDIX C

### ESDP Military Operations and Civilian Missions (as of Oct. 2009)

#### Twelve Current ESDP Operations and Missions

Operation/Mission	Area of Operation	Objective	Duration	Deployed Personnel (highest / current)
<b>EUFOR ALTHEA</b>	Bosnia	Security / Stability	since 12/2004	7,000 / 2,016
<b>EUNAVFOR ATALANTA</b>	Horn of Africa	Anti Piracy	since 12/2008	1800 / 1800
<b>EULEX Kosovo</b>	Kosovo	Rule and Law Reform	since 12/2008	1950 / 1710
<b>EUPM</b>	Bosnia	Police Training	since 1/2003	500 / 163
<b>EUMM</b>	Georgia	Monitoring	10/2008 – 10/2010	356 / 350
<b>EUPOL COPPS</b>	Palestine	Police Training	01/2006 – 12/2010	57 / 41
<b>EUBAM RAFAH</b>	Border Gaza/Egypt	Border Control	since 12/2005	89 / 20
<b>EUJUST LEX</b>	Iraq	Rule and Law Reform	since 7/2005	37 / 37
<b>EUPOL AFGHANISTAN</b>	Afghanistan	Police Training	06/2007 – 06/2010	400 / 245
<b>EU SSR Guinea-Bissau</b>	Guinea-Bissau	Security Sector Reform	since 06/2008	21 / 18
<b>EUPOL RD Congo</b>	Congo	Police Training	07/2007 – 06/2010	56 / 33
<b>EUSEC RD Congo</b>	Congo	Security Sector Reform (civ mil)	since 06/2005	60 / 43

### Ten Accomplished ESDP Operations and Missions

Operation/Mission	Area of Operation	Objective	Duration	Deployed Personnel
<b>CONCORDIA</b>	Macedonia	Security / Stability	12/2005 05/2006	320
<b>EUFOR Tchad</b>	Tchad / Central African Republic	Security / Stability	03/2008 03/2009	3700
<b>EUFOR RD Congo</b>	Kosovo	Security / Stability	07/2006 11/2006	2300
<b>ARTEMIS</b>	Congo (Bunia Region)	Security / Stability	06/2003 09/2003	2000
<b>EUPOL PROXIMA</b>	Macedonia	Police Training	12/2003 – 12/2005	200
<b>EUJUST Themis</b>	Georgia	Rule and Law Reform	07/2004 – 07/2005	12
<b>EUSR Border Support Team</b>	Georgia	Rule and Law Reform	09/2005 – 02/2008	13
<b>EUPOL Kinshasa</b>	Congo	Police Training	02/2005 – 07/2007	29
<b>AMM</b>	Indonesia (Aceh)	Monitoring	09/2005 – 12/2006	240
<b>AMIS EU Support</b>	Sudan (Darfur)	Support AU Mission	07/2005 – 12/2007	50

**Military Operations**

**Civilian Missions**

**Civil – Military Engagements**

Source: Volker Heise, *Zehn Jahre Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP) – Entwicklung, Stand und Probleme*, ed. Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) – Studie (Berlin 2009), 39-40, extracts of Tabelle 4.

## **APPENDIX D: List of Abbreviations**

AMM = Aceh Monitoring Mission

AMIS = African Union Mission in Sudan

AU = African Union

CIVCOM = Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

CDP = Capability Development Plan

CFSP = Common Foreign and Security Policy

CMCO = Civil Military Coordination

CPCC = Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability

CRT = Civilian Response Team

EATC = European Air Transport Command

EATF = European Air Transport Fleet

EEAS = European External Action Service

EDA = European Defense Agency

ESDP = European Security and Defense Policy

ESDI = European Security and Defense Identity

ESVP = Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik

ESS = European Security Strategy

EU = European Union

EU BG = EU Battlegroups

EU ISS = EU International Institute for Security Studies

EUMM = EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia

EUMC = EU Military Committee

EUMS = EU Military Staff

EUPM = EU Police Mission in Bosnia

EUPAT = European Policy Advisory Team for Macedonia

EUSC = EU Satellite-Center

GASP = Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik

GNP = Gross National Product

ISAF = International Security Assistance Force

KFOR = NATO Kosovo Force

MUSIS = Multinational Space-Based Imaging System for Surveillance, Reconnaissance and  
Observation

NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSS = National Security Strategy

OSCE = Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe

PSC = Political and Security Committee

RD Congo = Democratic Republic of Congo

SHAPE = Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

SFOR = NATO Stabilization Force for Bosnia

SSR = Security Sector Reform

UAV = Unmanned Armed Vehicle

UN = United Nations

U.S. = United States

UK = United Kingdom

WEU = West European Union

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